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INTRODUCTION

The right to recover damages for emotional distress is firmly
established in Minnesota law. l In 1886, the Minnesota
Supreme Court first recognized this right in Keyes v. Minneapolis
& St. Louis Railway.2 The court stated:
The mental distress and anxiety which may be proven in actions for personal injuries is confined to such as is connected with the bodily injury, and is fairly and reasonably
the plain consequence of such injury. The mental anguish,
like physical pain, to be taken into consideration in such
cases, is confined to such as is endured by the plaintiff in
consequence of a personal irtiury to himself.3
1. Minnesota jury Instruction Guide (JIG) 155 covers personal injury damages
and states that damages are recoverable for "[a]ny pain, disability, (disfigurement),
(embarrassment), or emotional distress experienced ... up to the time of trial." MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CIVILjURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES No. 155 at 141 (3d ed. 1986). JIG
158 also recognizes the right to recover similar damages that the injured person "is
reasonably certain to experience in the future." Id. No. 158, at 147.
2. 36 Minn. 290, 30 N.W. 888 (1886).
3. [d. at 293, 30 N.W. at 889. In Keyes, the plaintiff sought to recover damages
caused by the defendant's obstruction of a public highway. The plaintiff testified that
his greatest anxiety in attempting to extract his horses from a barbwire obstruction
was not for himself but for his wife and daughter, who were in the carriage while he
attempted to free his horses. The admission of that evidence was assigned as error
by the defendant following a verdict for the plaintiff. Although the court found that
the evidence ofthe plaintiff's anxiety for his wife and daughter should not have been
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Again, in 1916, in Patterson v. Blatti,4 the Minnesota Supreme
Court said that "it is well settled that in an action for personal
injury, mental suffering reasonably certain to be endured in
the future may be taken into account in estimating damage."5
The Patterson court also considered whether damages for emotional distress arising from a disfigurement were recoverable.
The court noted that the decisions in other jurisdictions were
in "hopeless conflict" as to whether "humiliation or mortification to arise in the future on account of disfigurement of a person is a proper element of damage."6 However, having
recognized that damages for mental suffering in a personal injury claim are recoverable, the court saw no reason to treat
mental suffering consisting of humiliation or mortification
differently:
The cause is in no sense uncertain. It is no more intangible
or difficult of proof than is mental suffering in general. The
fact that it may survive the physical pain does not seem to us
decisive as long as it has its inception with the physical injury. We hold that it was proper for the court to instruct the
jury that they might take into account the humiliation, if
any, from permanent disfigurement of person. 7

Despite these unequivocal statements, many questions remain unanswered. The recovery of damages for emotional distress is subject to varying and perhaps seemingly inconsistent
standards. Recovery may depend on whether a claim is based
on negligence or an intentional tort. Recovery may also depend on whether the emotional distress arose from the commission of a recognized tort, a statutory violation, or forms the
sole basis of the claim. Likewise, recovery in accident cases deadmitted, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence did not constitute
prejudicial error. [d., 30 N.W. at 889-90.
4. 133 Minn. 23, 157 N.W. 717 (1916).
5. Id. at 27, 157 N.W. at 718 (citing Cooper v. St. Paul City Ry., 54 Minn. 379,
56 N.W. 42 (1893); Johnson v. Northern Pac. R.R., 47 Minn. 430, 50 N.W. 473
(1891». Cooper and Johnson dealt specifically with the right of an expert to form an
opinion based in part on the statements made to a physician by a patient. In these
decisions, the court held that such opinions are admissible. Cooper, 54 Minn. at 383,
56 N.W. at 43; Johnson, 47 Minn. at 432,50 N.W. at 474.
6. 133 Minn. at 25, 157 N.W. at 718.
7. !d. at 27,157 N.W. at 718. Patterson was reaffirmed in Carlson v. Naddy, 181
Minn. 180,232 N.W. 3 (1930), where the defendant claimed that damages for humiliation were recoverable even when disfigurement was concealed by clothing. [d. at
182,232 N.W. at 4. The court concluded that such evidence determined the amount
of damages, not whether damages should be recoverable. [d.
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pends on whether the claimant suffered physical injury, was in
the zone of danger but not injured, or was simply a bystander
who was neither injured nor threatened with physical injury.
This Article will examine the right to recover damages for
emotional distress in Minnesota, with emphasis on claims for
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After a brief history of emotional distress law, this Article will
discuss claims for emotional distress based on negligence, intentional torts, and statutory violations. These areas are examined in detail to determine the standards for the recovery of
emotional harm in Minnesota and to evaluate whether the
standards are applied consistently. The Article also examines
the right to recover damages for emotional distress in specific
contexts, including contractual disputes, professional malpractice, and business torts.
II.

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In cases where the plaintiff is physically injured by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff will clearly be entitled to recover for the past and future mental anguish suffered as a
result of those injuries. Over the past one hundred years, the
primary issue in determining recovery in negligence cases has
been whether the plaintiff was in the zone of danger. A secondary issue, and one that calls into question the legitimacy of
the zone of danger rule, is whether a plaintiff who neither suffers nor is threatened by physical injury may recover for emotional distress.
In 1892, the Minnesota Supreme Court questioned whether
emotional distress alone is a sufficient injury to justify recovery. In Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway,8 the plaintiff, a passenger
in one of defendant's streetcars, alleged that she suffered "sudden fright and reasonable fear of immediate death or great
bodily injury" when the defendant's street car negligently
crossed in front of a cable train. 9 The shock suffered by the
plaintiff "threw her into violent convulsions, and caused ... a
miscarriage, and subsequent illness."lO The defendant demurred to the complaint.
The court never reached a conclusion to its initial inquiry,
8. 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
9. Id. at 137, 50 N.W. at 1034.
10. Id.
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finding that the plaintiff had suffered "physical injury, as serious, certainly, as would be the breaking of an arm or a leg."ll
Instead, most of the court's opinion focused on whether the
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's i~uries:
[I]f the fright was the natural consequence of.-was brought
about, caused by-the circumstances of peril and alarm in
which defendant's negligence placed plaintiff, and the fright
caused the nervous shock and convulsions and consequent
illness, the negligence was the proximate cause of those injuries. That a mental condition or operation on the part of
the one injured comes between the negligence and injury
does not necessarily break the required sequence of intermediate causes. . . . The defendant suggested that plaintiff's pregnancy rendered her more susceptible to
groundless alarm, and accounts more naturally and fairly
than defendant's negligence for the injurious consequences.
Certainly a woman in her condition has as good a right to
be carried as anyone, and is entitled to at least as high a
degree of care on the part of the carrier. . .. If the recovery
of a passenger in feeble health were to be limited to what he
would have been entitled to had he been sound, then, in
case of a destruction by fire or wrecking of a railroad car
through the negligence of those in charge of it, if all the
passengers but one were able to leave it in time to escape
injury, and that one could not because sick or lame, he
could not recover at all. The suggestion mentioned would,
if carried to its logical consequences, lead to such a
conclusion. 12

Thus, Purcell adopted the zone of danger rule, waiving any
requirement of an actual impact to sustain the claim for mental
anguish. The Purcell court also imposed the requirement that a
physical manifestation must arise from the mental anguish. 13
Minnesota thus took the lead in extending a plaintiff's right to
recover in negligence actions where the emotional distress was
not accompanied by physical impact. The next two sections of
this Article analyze the zone of danger and the physical injury
requirements in more depth. Part A analyzes the zone of danger requirement; Part B analyzes the physical injury
requirement.
11. /d.
12. Id. at 138-39, 50 N.W. at 1035.

13. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 137, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
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The Zone of Danger Requirement

The zone of danger issue raises several questions. First, and
most significant, is whether the requirement is confined only to
the risk of physical injury. Second, is whether a plaintiff in the
zone of danger must fear for her own safety or whether fear for
the safety of another will suffice. Third, is whether the zone of
danger limitation should give way to a bystander recovery rule.
The fourth issue concerns the "direct victim" standard and
asks whether the standard would be appropriate for some
cases, even if the Minnesota Supreme Court continues to adhere to the zone of danger rule. This section examines the
zone of danger requirement as it has been applied by the Minnesota courts.
1.

The Zone

of Physical Danger?

In 1969, in Okrina v. Midwestern COrp.,14 the Minnesota
Supreme Court adhered to the Purcell rule but expressed concern about compensating a person whose injuries are "the result of unusual sensitivity or susceptibility to shock."15 The
plaintiff in Okrina was almost hit when a wall collapsed near a
construction site. Immediately prior to the collapse, she heard
what sounded like a bomb. Having witnessed the fall of the
wall, the plaintiff thought the entire building would collapse.
Although she escaped without being hit by any of the debris,
the plaintiff "became sick and numb" immediately after the accident and was hospitalized for five days.16 Afterward, she had
chronic pain in her head, back, and leg. Her personality
changed. Her doctor attributed her condition to the emotional
shock caused by the wall collapse. 17
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's injury could not
have been reasonably foreseen. The court replied, however,
that "foreseeability is a test of negligence and not of damages.
If a defendant can foresee some harm to one to whom he owes
a duty, the exact nature and extent of the harm need not be
foreseeable to permit recovery for all of the damages proximately caused."18 Since failing to shore up the wall properly
14. 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969).
15. [d. at 405, 165 N.W.2d at 263.
16. [d. at 403, 165 N.W.2d at 262.
17. [d.
18. /d. at 405, 165 N.W.2d at 263.
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amounted to negligence, the defendant could have foreseen
some risk of injury. Further, the court stated that the "defendant had a duty to foresee some harm to plaintiff by the collapse
of a wall supporting a building occupied by her .... "19 The
court found that it would be unusual if a person in the plaintiff's position did not suffer severe shock from the experience.
Thus, because injury was foreseeable and the defendant was
negligent, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, "notwithstanding her unusual susceptibility to the consequences of her fear .... "20
In Stadler v. Cross,21 parents of a child struck by the defendants' pickup truck alleged that they suffered emotional distress
with physical symptoms, even though they were not in the zone
of danger at the time their child was injured. The mother,
standing only a few yards from the road, heard the screeching
of the pickup truck's brakes and turned to see her son fly
through the air and hit the pavement. The father, approximately 100 yards away, heard the accident and realized when
he arrived at the scene that it was his son who was hit. 22
The sole issue in Stadler was whether Minnesota should extend the zone of danger rule to allow bystander recovery. The
court found that long-established policy dictated adherence to
the zone of danger rule:
A person's liability for the consequences of her or his actions cannot be unlimited. The limits imposed must be as
workable, reasonable, logical, and just as possible. If the
limits cannot be consistently and meaningfully applied by
courts and juries, then the imposition of liability would become arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the cause of
just apportionment of the losses would suffer. . . . Under
the zone-of-danger rule the courts and juries can objectively
determine whether plaintiffs were within the zone of danger. Furthermore, plaintiffs can be cross-examined regarding whether their fear was for themselves or for another.
None of the other proposed limitations can be as readily
and consistently applied. 23

The court concluded that the line-drawing problems presented
19.
(1969).
20.
21.
22.
23.

Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 406, 165 N.W.2d 259, 264
Id.
295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980).
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
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by the bystander recovery rule could not be overcome, thus
ensuring that the zone of danger rule would continue to be the
law in Minnesota. 24
In 1982, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused yet another
opportunity to expand the bases allowing for recovery in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. In Langeland v.
Farmers State Bank,25 plaintiff landowners lost their right to redeem their farm from mortgage foreclosure because the defendants' misinterpreted the redemption statute. The plaintiffs
sought, inter alia, to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 26 The defendants included Farmers State
Bank, the bank~s president, the bank's attorney, and one of the
judgment creditors and its attorney.27
In arguing to the court, the plaintiffs relied on a California
appellate decision. In Jarchow v. Transamenca Title Insurance
Co. ,28 the California Court of Appeals allowed a plaintiff to recover damages for emotional distress that occurred when a title insurance company failed to discover two easements on the
plaintiff's property. The title insurance company's negligence
resulted in litigation expenses and financial hardship.29 The
court of appeals held that "courts may adjudicate negligence
claims for mental distress when sufficient guarantees of genuiness [sic] are found in the facts of the case, e.g., when the
plaintiff has suffered substantial damage apart from the alleged
emotional injury."gO
The plaintiffs in Langeland claimed that the loss of title to
their farm resulted in illness, marital problems, problems in
obtaining credit, and public embarrassment and humiliation
for them and their children. g1 Further, Gerald Langeland
24. The court noted other potential. but nondispositive. justifications for the
limitation:
Other factors frequently considered in these cases but which we do not
consider dispositive in light of the problems with limiting liability include
the fear of a proliferation of claims. the potential for fraudulent claims. the
foreseeability of the injury. and unduly burdensome liability.
Id. at 555 n.3 (citations omitted).
25. 319 N.W.2d 26. 30 (Minn. 1982).
26. /d.
27. /d. at 29.
28. 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). overruled by Soto v. Royal Globe Ins.
Co .• 229 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
29. Jarchow. 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
30. [d. at 484 (citation omitted).
31. Langeland. 319 N.W.2d at 29.
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claimed that he was unable to work. S2 The Langelands sought
neither medical advice nor counseling for their problems. ss
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their claim:
The Langelands' only injury beyond their claimed emotional distress is attorneys fees expended in having the certificate set aside. Were we to adopt the Jarchow rule, it is
possible that this expense could constitute "substantial
damage" sufficient to sustain the additional claim for emotional distress. However, we decline to do so. We have
consistently held that no cause of action exists for the negligent infliction of emotional distress absent either physical
injury or physical danger to the plaintiff. S4

Leaon v. Washington County,S5 decided in 1986, discussed the
right to recover damages for both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Leaon, a Washington County
deputy sheriff was humiliated at a stag party organized by four
deputies. When the plaintiff arrived late at the party, six men
took him to the stage and forced him to lie down with a dollar
bill in his mouth. A nude dancer touched her vagina to his face
and removed the dollar bill from his mouth with her hand.
The plaintiff, distressed and humiliated, left the party shortly
thereafter.
The incident gave rise to several claims by Leaon and his
wife, including a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 36 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's denial of the plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim. s7
In discussing the zone of danger requirement, the court held
that a plaintiff who does not suffer a physical impact may "recover for emotional disorders if plaintiff was within the scope of
danger of the negligent act and if plaintiff exhibits physical manifestations of the emotional distress. "S8 The court held that
Leaon's spouse's claim was barred because she was not in the
zone of danger, and that Leaon's claim was barred because he
was unable to show physical manifestations of emotional
32. [d.
33. [d.
34. [d. at 32 (citations omitted).

35. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986).
36. [d. at 870.

37. [d. at 874.
38. /d. at 875 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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distress. 39
The court relied on Stadler v. Cross 40 in denying the plaintiffs'
claims.41 However, in Stadler, the court had "recognized that a
person within the zone of danger of physical impact who reasonably
fears for his or her own safety" would be entitled to recover for
severe emotional distress, if the distress resulted in physical
injury.42 Similarly, Langeland required that the plaintiff be in
"some personal physical danger caused by the defendant's negligence" before damages for emotional distress may be
awarded. 43
Accordingly, Purcell and Langeland view the zone of danger
issue narrowly, requiring a physical element to be in the zone
of danger. But the language in Leaon has the potential to be
broader, requiring the plaintiff to be in the zone of danger, not
the zone of physical danger. However, Leaon may be reconciled with Langeland because there were personal threats to
Leaon's bodily integrity from the nude dancer and the police
officers who physically forced him to lie down on the stage with
the dollar bill in his mouth. 44 Further, Leaon's complaint included claims for false imprisonment and battery.45 On that
basis, the claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress arguably placed the plaintiff in the zone of physical danITer. Thus, although the Leaon court's description of the zone
of danger requirement appears broader than Langeland's, in application, the court did not broaden the requirement because
Leaon was arguably in the zone of physical danger. The court
of appeals has adhered to the supreme court's guidelines,46
with an implied potential extension in State v. Tonka Corp. ,47 for
39. Id.
40. 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980).
41. Leaon, 397 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986).
42. Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 553 (emphasis added).
43. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26,31 (Minn. 1982) (emphasis added).
44. Leaon, 397 N.W.2d at 869.
45. Id. at 869-70.
46. See, e.g., Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg., Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
47. 420 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Minn. May 4, 1988).
The Woykes brought suit against Tonka for negligent disposal of hazardous substances on their property. They sued both for negligent infliction of emotional distress and personal injury. !d. at 627. In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the
emotional distress claim, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted the limitation on
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress to cases where the plaintiff is
within the zone of danger and exhibits physical manifestations caused by the emo-
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emotional harm that results from pollution.
2.

Where Emotional Harm is the Product of Fear for Another's
Safety

The general rule in Minnesota requires that a plaintiff in order to recover for emotional distress must be in the zone of
danger. Courts have refused to extend recovery to plaintiffs
who simply fear that another will sustain injury. The requirement that emotional distress claimants fear for their own safety
is based on the continued repetition of the requirements of an
emotional distress claim since they were first established in
Purcell. 48 Although Minnesota courts have had ample opportunity to consider adopting a "bystander recovery" rule, the
courts have rigidly adhered to the zone of danger rule.
In 1991, in Silberstein v. Cordie, 49 the court of appeals held
that the issue of whether family members were in the zone of
danger when the husband and father of the family was murdered in the family home was a question for the jury.50 The
case arose out of the brutal murder of Delton Silberstein by a
mentally ill individual, Randy Cordie. 51 Silberstein was murdered in his home when his wife and children were present in
the home, but in a different room. 52
tional distress. There was no medical evidence of the emotional distress the plaintiffs
claimed, and, absent that showing, the court of appeals held that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress "is not usually appropriate." [d.
The Woykes also argued that their claim for emotional distress could be based
upon an "implied finding of nuisance." [d. That claim was rejected because a claim
of nuisance simply describes a type of damage, rather than a cause of action. /d.
Where the acts or omissions constituting negligence are the same that give rise to the
claim for nuisance, the rules applicable to negligence apply. /d. (citing Randall v.
Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 86, 103 N.W. 131,135 (1960». The court thus
disallowed the plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress by application of the same rules
applicable to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. And although
the plaintiffs would be entitled to a separate finding on their nuisance claim, the
physical manifestation requirement still barred recovery. [d. at 627-28.
Thus, by precluding the Woykes from recovering emotional distress damages
under the physical injury requirement, it is implicit that the court found them to be in
the zone of danger. Consequently, because the defendant's conduct involved pollution, the Tonka court may have expanded the zone of danger requirement temporally.
That is, Tonka did not involve a sudden incident as in Langeland and Leaon, but rather
a continuing practice resulting in emotional distress.
48. Purcell v. St Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
49. 474 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
50. [d. at 856-57.
51. [d. at 853.
52. [d.
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Bonnie Silberstein and her two minor children were within
the physical zone of danger. Though Bonnie and her children did not see the shooting, they heard the five gunshots.
Moreover, during the shooting spree, Cordie, armed with
the shotgun, twice entered the bedroom where Bonnie and
the children were. While Cordie was in the bedroom, Bonnie testified she was "filled with terror" personally and
feared for the safety of her children. Under these circumstances, questions of fact exist whether Bonnie and her children reasonably feared for their safety.5!1

Although not at issue in the case, whether Bonnie Silberstein
feared for her own safety or that of her children should be irrelevant under the circumstances. This analysis suggests a
slight modification of the Purcell rule as it has carried forward
to include cases where the emotional injury in a negligence
case includes claims where the claimant fears for the safety of
others, if the claimant is in the zone of danger.
Application of existing Minnesota proximate cause principles could justify recovery in those cases without conflicting
with the zone of danger cases such as Stadler and Purcell.
In Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M & O. Ry., 54 the Minnesota
Supreme Court formulated a direct consequences rule for
resolving proximate cause issues:
What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and
may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent,
but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is
the proximate cause of an injury which ensues. If a person
had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act
would or might result in injury to anybody, then, of course,
the act would not be negligent at all; but, if the act itself is
negligent, then the person guilty of it is equally liable for all
its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could
have foreseen them or not. Otherwise expressed, the law is
53. Id. at 856-57. The court elaborated in a footnote:
Cordie's irrational conduct plainly extended the contours of the zone of
danger to include the children's bedroom. During the gruesome events,
Cordie told Bonnie Silberstein that her husband had killed thirty people; he
also quoted scripture and tossed a Bible on her child's bed; and he said he
must cut out Delton's liver to prove Delton was a woman disguised as a man.
Further, Cordie told Bonnie not to be "grossed out" by the brains or "guts
hanging out," that the blood was not real, that Delton would be on the
street tommorrow [sic] in disguise, and that he would have to shoot him
again.
Id. at 856 n.3.
54. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896).
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that if the act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of
ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately
resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated
the particular injury which did happen. Consequences
which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening
efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural
and proximate; and for such consequences the original
wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have
foreseen the particular results which did follow. 55
The Christianson approach has been reaffirmed many times, including in Okrina. 56 Application of this approach to cases

where the claimant claims emotional distress as a result of witnessing injury to another results in the following argument:
The plaintiff was in the zone of danger. She reasonably
feared for her own safety. She suffered severe emotional
distress that was the product of fear for herself or the safety
of a family member. The distress resulted in physical harm
within the meaning of Okrina. Because emotional harm and
resultant physical injury were foreseeable under the circumstances, it is irrelevant if the defendant was unable to foresee the exact manner of occurrence.

This result has some support in case law, including the 1923
English case of Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers. 57 In Hambrook, the
court said:
[W]hat a man ought to have anticipated is material when
considering the extent of his duty. . . . [T]he defendant
ought to have anticipated that if his lorry ran away down
this narrow street, it might terrify some woman to such an
extent, through fear of some immediate bodily injury to
herself, that she would receive such a mental shock as would
injure her health. Can any real distinction be drawn from
the point of view of what the defendant ought to have anticipated and what, therefore, his duty was, between that case
and the case of a woman whose fear is for her child, and not
for herself? Take a case in point as a test. Assume two
mothers crossing this street at the same time when this lorry
comes thundering down, each holding a small child by the
hand. One mother is courageous and devoted to her child.
She is terrified, but thinks only of the damage to her child,
55. Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641.
56. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969).
57. I K.B. 141 (1925).
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and not at all about herself. The other woman is timid and
lacking in the motherly instinct. She also is terrified, but
thinks only of the damage to herself and not at all about her
child. The health of both mothers is seriously affected by
the mental shock occasioned by the fright. Can any distinction be drawn between the two cases? Will the law recognize a cause of action in the case of the less deserving
mother, and none in the case of the more deserving one?
Does the law say that the defendant ought reasonably to
have anticipated the non-natural feeling of the timid
mother, and not the natural feeling of the courageous
mother? I think not. 58
Section 436 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also supports recovery:
(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of
care designed to protect another from a fright or other
emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as
involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that
the harm results solely through the internal operation of the
fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the
actor from liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise
than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and
immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm
results solely from the internal operation of fright or other
emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from
liability.
(3) The rule stated in subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the other results from his shock or fright at harm
or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in
his presence. 59
The Restatement's comments make it clear that the first subsection is applicable only in a narrow range of cases where
the actor's conduct is intended or obviously likely to cause
severe fright or other emotional disturbance, although it is
not intended to cause the bodily harm which results from it.
It applies only when the fright or emotional disturbance to
which the actor intends to subject the other or to which he
should realize the other is likely to be subjected, is such,
because of its severe character, that a reasonable man would
58. Id. at 156 (Bankes, LJ.).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS

§ 436 (1965).
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realize the likelihood that it might produce harmful physical
consequences . . . .60

Comment f explains paragraph (3) of section 436:
Under the rule stated in Subsection (3), that stated in Subsection (2) applies where the defendant's negligent conduct
threatens bodily harm to the plaintiff through direct impact
upon his person, or in some other way than through emotional disturbance, and the bodily harm is brought about instead by the plaintiff's emotional disturbance at the peril or
harm of a third person. In such a case the defendant is subject to liability if the third person is a member of the plaintiff's immediate family, and the peril or harm to such a
person occurs in the plaintiff's presence. In other words,
the rule stated in Subsection (2) applies in such cases, even
though the plaintiff's shock or fright is not due to any fear
for his own safety, but to fear for the safety of his wife or
child .... 61

In summary, both the Restatement and the Minnesota proximate cause decisions support recovery under a negligence theory by a claimant who is in the zone of danger and fears for the
safety of either herself or a family member.
3.

A Bystander Recovery Rule for Minnesota?

In 1968, in Dillon v. Legg,62 the California Supreme Court established guidelines for the recovery of damages by a bystander for the negligent infliction of emotional distress:
We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plaintiff suffered a shock which resulted in physical injury and we
confine our ruling to that case. In determining, in such a
case, whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff [mother], or in other terminology, whether
defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will
take into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether
plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2)
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether
60. /d. § 436 cmt. a.
61. Id. § 436 cmt. f. The illustration following comment f is drawn from
Hambrook.
62. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only
a distant relationship ....
In light of these factors the court will determine whether
the accident and harm was reasonably foreseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular defendant as an individual would have in actuality
foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that
courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The courts
thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote
and unexpected. 63

Subsequent decisions of the California Supreme Court and
California Court of Appeals have expanded Dillon and relaxed
the guidelines in order to avoid creating arbitrary limitations
on the right to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional
dis tres s. 64
But the California courts' loose application of the Dillon
guidelines prompted the California Supreme Court, in Thing v.
La Chusa,65 to limit the right of a bystander to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress by solidifying the factors
that were only guidelines in Dillon:
We conclude, therefore, that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said
plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is
present at the scene of the injury producing event at the
time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to
the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in
a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances. 66
In one sense, La Chusa answers criticisms of the bystander
recovery rule. The La Chusa court established rigid limitations

on the right of a bystander to recover for emotional harm and
created a rule that is easier to administer than one that simply
uses the Dillon factors as "guidelines." Any court considering
63. Id. at 920-21.
64. For a discussion of the post-Dillon expansions, see Thing v. La Chusa, 771
P.2d 814,821-25 (Cal. 1989).
65. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
66. /d. at 829-30.
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the bystander recovery rule profits from the California courts'
past experience in applying the bystander recovery rule.
In another sense, the rule adopted in La Chusa establishes
yet another set of guidelines that will permit recovery in some
bystander recovery cases but deny recovery in many others
where the injury is as serious. For example, the limitation on
recovery to plaintiffs who are closely related to the victim will
foreclose recovery by any person who suffers serious emotional harm but is not in a state-sanctioned relationship. The
rule adopted by the court in La Chusa is a two-edged sword,
permitting recovery in some cases, but arbitrarily denying it in
others. The rule raises questions of fundamental fairness in
the development and application of common law rules and necessitates an answer to the question of whether the rule should
be extended to permit bystander recovery if the rule can only
be applied arbitrarily.
Irrespective of the position the Minnesota Supreme Court
will ultimately take on the bystander recovery issue, a question
remains as to whether recovery should be allowed when the
plaintiff is not in the zone of danger but is a "direct victim" of
negligent conduct by another and suffers emotional distress as
a result of the breach.
4.

Direct Victim Recovery?

The California Supreme Court adopted the "direct victim"
theory of recovery in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals. 67 Suit
in Molien arose from an alleged negligent diagnosis of syphilis
in the plaintiff's wife. 68 The plaintiff's wife became upset and
suspected that her husband had engaged in extramarital affairs.69 The tension and hostility that arose resulted in the
breakup of their marriage. 70 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant doctors "knew or should have known their diagnosis
that plaintiff's wife had syphilis and that he might also have the
disease would cause him emotional distress."7l
While Dillon presented an impediment to the plaintiff's recovery, the Molien court distinguished it:
67. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
68. Id. at 814.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 814-15.
71. Id. at 815.
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It must be remembered, however, that in Dillon the plaintiff
sought recovery of damages she suffered as a percipient witness to the injury of a third person, and the three guidelines
there noted served as a limitation on that particular cause of
action. Here, by contrast, plaintiff was himself a direct victim of the assertedly negligent act. By insisting that the
present facts fail to satisfy the first and second of the Dillon
criteria, defendants urge a rote application of the guidelines
to a case factually dissimilar to the bystander scenario. In
so doing, they overlook our explicit statement in Dillon that
an obligation hinging on foreseeability "must necessarily be
adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis .... [N]o immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation for
every circumstance in the future."
Hence the significance of Dillon for the present action lies
not in its delineation of guidelines fashioned for resolution
of the precise issue then before us; rather, we apply its general principle of foreseeability to the facts at hand, much as
we have done in other cases presenting complex questions
of tort liability. 72
Given the foreseeability of the harm, the court held that the
defendants owed a duty to exercise care in diagnosing the
plaintiff's wife's physical condition. 73 Further, in allowing recovery, the court concluded that the risk of harm to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable and that the defendants'
tortious conduct was directed toward the plaintiff and his
wife.74 Thus, Molien established that, if a person suffering
emotional distress is a "direct victim" of that distress, the Dillon guidelines are inapplicable.
Later, in Ochoa v. Superior Court,15 the California Supreme
Court limited the Molien court's "direct victim" recovery to
cases where the defendant's negligence is "by its very nature
directed at" the plaintiff. 76 At the same time, Ochoa expanded
the right to recover damages for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress by holding that the Dillon factors were only
guidelines and satisfaction of the guidelines was not essential
72. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 816-17 (Cal. 1980) (citing
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968».
73. Id. The court also abandoned the physical irtiury requirement by holding
that the plaintiff was not barred from recovery because he sustained no physical injury. /d. at 819-21.
74. Id. at 817.
75. 703 P.2d I (Cal. 1985).
76. Id. at 10.
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to recovery. 77
The status of the Molien "direct victim" standard has been
tenuous. In Thing v. La Chusa,'s the California Supreme Court
expressed its reservations with the "direct victim" standard but
was not presented with an occasion to directly overrule Molien.
More recently, in Burgess v. Superior Court,79 the court acknowledged criticism of the "direct victim" approach in Molien,
including its own criticism, but nonetheless reaffirmed Molien
while attempting to provide more specific guidelines for the
continued application of the "direct victim" approach.so
The plaintiffs in Burgess were the mother of a child delivered
by her obstetrician, the child, and the child's father. The child
suffered permanent brain damage and injury to his central nervous system because of oxygen deprivation during the course
of the delivery, allegedly due to the negligence of the obstetrician. S ) During the course of the litigation, the child died, allegedly from injuries sustained in the delivery. The parents
subsequently instituted a wrongful death action that was consolidated with the plaintiffs' malpractice action. Adhering to
La Chusa, the trial court granted the motion. s2 The court of
appeals vacated the trial court's order, holding that La Chusa
was inapplicable because Burgess, the mother, was a "direct
victim" under Molien. s3
In Burgess, the court reiterated its concern expressed in La
Chusa: "foreseeability of the injury alone is not a useful 'guideline' or a meaningful restriction on the scope" of an action for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress,s4 but the court
noted that, unlike the facts in Ochoa and Molien, the plaintiff in
Burgess was a " 'traditional' plaintiff with a professional negligence cause of action."s5 Thus understood, the court characterized the claim simply as "an ordinary professional
malpractice claim, which seeks as an element of damage com77. [d. at 8.
78. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
79. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
80. /d. at 1202.
81. [d. at 1199.
82. [d.
83. Id.
84. Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Thing,
771 P.2d at 814).
85. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1202.
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pensation for her serious emotional distress. "86
In "direct victim" cases the plaintiff would be precluded
from recovering because of inability to meet the prerequisites
of La Chusa. The distinction is illustrated in Burgess in a footnote discussion of the father's claim in cases involving negligent prenatal care of his child:
We note ... that the physician-patient relationship critical
to a mother's cause of action is almost always absent in a
father's claim. It, therefore, appears that a father must meet
the criteria set forth in La Chusa if he is to state a viable
claim. 87
86. Id. at 1203. The court drew a parallel to its earlier decision in Marlene F. v.
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989). In Marlene F., the
court permitted recovery of damages for emotional distress by a mother whose son
was molested by a therapist who was treating both mother and son for intrafamily
problems. The action of the therapist constituted a breach of a direct duty to the
mother under circumstances where the emotional injury was foreseeable. Marlene F.,
831 P.2d at 1203. For a good discussion of Marlene F., its implications, and suggestions for building on the approach in direct victim actions, see Julie A. Davies, Direct
Actions/or Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 U. WASH. L. REV. I (1992).
The Burgess court also confronted its own rule precluding recovery of damages
for the loss of filial consortium, holding that the rule should not bar the plaintiff's
claim for damages for emotional distress but that it should limit her recovery:
While some portion of Burgess' emotional distress may have arisen from her
loss of Joseph's consortium, other portions of her emotional distress may
have separate, distinct origins that would not subject damages for these portions of her emotional distress to a bar mandated by the policy concerns
underlying the prohibition of the loss of filial consortium claim. Thus, we
hold that damages arising from loss of Joseph's affection, society, companionship, love and disruption of Burgess' "normal" routine oflife to care for
Joseph cannot be recovered by Burgess no matter how her claim for these
damages is denominated. We believe that this limitation on recovery eliminates the possibility of duplicative recovery by Burgess for damages which
may be recovered by her child. We further hold to the extent, however, that
Burgess's emotional distress arose from the "abnormal event" of participating in a negligent delivery and reacting to the unexpected outcome of her
pregnancy with resulting" 'fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as physical pain resulting
from defendant's breach of duty, then Burgess's [sic] emotional distress is of
the type for which we have previously recognized recovery should be provided and is distinguishable from the type of emotional distress for which
recovery is prohibited by virtue of the policy considerations underlying the
prohibition of filial consortium claims.
Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1208-09 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 1204 n.8 (citations omitted). Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, (Minn. May 24, 1992),
is a good example of a Minnesota case where the claim might be denied under a
direct victim standard. The parents in the case sustained emotional injury and sued
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Had they sued for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, they would not have met the zone of danger rules established
by the Minnesota Supreme Court because they were clearly outside the zone of physical danger. The parents also would not have met the Burgess guidelines for the recov-
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered exceptions to
the zone of danger rule. Whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court would adopt the approach suggested by the California
Supreme Court in Burgess is unclear. In Langeland v. Farmers
State Bank,88 landowners sued for losses incurred because of a
mortgage foreclosure. 89 The plaintiffs brought, inter alia, a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. 90 . The court
refused to follow California's lead, noting that "[w]ere we to
adopt the [California] rule, it is possible that this expense
could constitute 'substantial damage' sufficient to sustain the
additional claim for emotional distress. However, we decline
to do SO."91
The supreme court opinion in Langeland does not appear, in
effect, to completely rule out the possibility of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim in cases other than those
involving actual physical injury or the threat of injury to the
plaintiff. 92 In either, the physical disability requirement must
be met. 93 The problem is in defining the types of cases where
negligent infliction claims will be recognized without the zone
of danger requirement.
It is important to note that the California rule the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected in Langeland was not the rule the court
formulated in Burgess, a rule that both permited and limited direct victim recovery. Thus, the possibility still exists for the
Minnesota Supreme Court to adopt the Burgess approach, even
if it adheres to the basic zone of danger/physical formulation
as the standard for resolving negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases.
Langeland is arguably overinclusive insofar as it results in the
denial of recovery in cases where a breach of an underlying
obligation owed by the defendant to the claimant, unless the
claimant is able to establish that she is in the zone of danger or
suffers physical injury. That means that, in any case where the
ery of emotional harm because no relationship existed between the Church and
parents to justify a finding of duty and to support recovery of damages for the emo.
tional harm sustained.
88. 319 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1982).
89. !d. at 28-29.
90. Id. at 31.
91. [d. at 32.
92. Langeland, 319 N.W.2d at 32.
93. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Minn. 1982).
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primary harm suffered is economic harm, there cannot be recovery for emotional distress unless the claimant establishes
the zone of danger requirements or the elements of a section
46 c1aim. 94 Yet, there may be a variety of cases where the defendant has acted negligently and caused emotional injury to
the claimant but has caused no physical harm. Putting aside
the requirement that physical injury arise out of the emotional
distress for the moment, rigid adherence to the zone of danger
rules will prohibit recovery even in situations where the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff and has breached that duty.
A broader rule in the "direct victim" cases, such as Burgess,
would permit Minnesota courts to analyze the issue of whether
recovery should be granted by using the same policy factors
used to analyze duty cases in general. 95

B.

The Physical Injury Requirement

In analyzing the physical injury requirement of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, two questions arise: (1)
How should the standard be applied after Purcell; and (2) Is the
requirement still reasonable in light of its abandonment in
other jurisdictions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Stadler 96
seemed to change the physical injury requirement. Even
though the court adhered to the zone of danger requirement,
the court stated, "[w]e have recognized that a person within
the zone of danger of physical impact who reasonably fears for
his or her own safety and who consequently suffers severe
emotional distress with resultant physical injury may recover. "97 Thus, the court appeared to add a requirement of
"severe emotional distress" to the equation, an element that
neither Purce1l 98 nor Okrina 99 appear to have required.
94. See infra Part lILA.
95. See, e.g., Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989) (holding
that a commercial parking ramp owner-operator owes a dUly to its customers to protect them from criminal assaults, based on existence of a special relationship); Madsen v. Park Nicollet Medical Ctr., 414 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987) (refusing to extend
right to recover under informed consent theory to genetic counseling cases and limiting the informed consent rule to cases where the plaintiff's physical integrity is violated); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982) (denying recovery for loss
of parental consortium).
96. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980).
97. /d. at 553.
98. Purcell v. Sc Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).

HeinOnline -- 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 22 1993

1993]

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

23

While the difference in the court's language could be merely
semantics, the Stadler decision could command greater weight,
particularly in cases where the emotional injury appears to be
minor but the physical consequences are substantial. Perhaps
it is fair to say that, in any situation where there are physical
manifestations of the emotional injury, the emotional injury
will undoubtedly be deemed severe.
The severe emotional distress requirement was applied in
Leaon,loo where the plaintiff was subjected to ridicule and humiliation at a stag party but was barred from asserting a claim
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress:
Here the trial court ruled that Donald Leaon failed to show
physical manifestations of emotional distress. . . . Donald
Leaon testified he lost weight (later regained), became depressed, and exhibited feelings of anger, fear, and bitterness. These symptoms do not satisfy the physical
manifestations test, a test designed to assure the genuineness of the alleged emotional distress. 101

The Leaon court contrasted the Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision in Q;till v. Trans- World Airlines, Inc. 102 In Quill, the
plaintiff suffered emotional distress when the commercial airplane in which he was riding suddenly rolled over and plunged
downward, at just below the speed of sound, in a tailspin that
lasted forty seconds.103 Five seconds before impact, the pilot
managed to pull the airplane out of the tailspin. 104 The G
force on the plaintiff was so strong that he was unable to reach
the oxygen mask above his head. l05 The noise was extremely
loud. After the pilot pulled the airplane out of the tailspin the
plane continued to shake for the next forty minutes. l06 The
crew advised the passengers on emergency landing
procedures. 107
The court of appeals in Q;till recognized that the Minnesota
cases did not answer the narrower question of how severely the
99. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969).
100. Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986).
101. [d. at 875.
102. 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 18, 1985).
103. [d. at 440.
104. [d.
105. [d.
106. [d.

107. Quill v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985),
review denied, (Minn. Apr. II, 1985).
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emotional distress must physically manifest itself before recovery will be allowed. 108 The court decided that the standards
applicable to the intentional infliction of emotional distress
cause 109 of action were inapplicable to a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress:
First, the supreme court did not state the independent tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress displaced all
other torts in which damages for emotional distress had
been allowed. Second, [recent cases] refer to physical
symptoms without suggesting plaintiffs must meet the high
threshold [for intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims]. Minnesota law has long separated the two emotional distress torts, not recognizing one until 90 years after
adopting the other. We see little basis for borrowing an element from one to add to the other, particularly when the
zone of danger rule provides an indicia of genuineness the
intentional tort requirements lack. I 10

The court then considered whether the plaintiff met the
physical injury or symptom requirement for negligent infliction claims. The court noted a lack of consistency on the issue
and that some jurisdictions, such as California, have abandoned the requirement. II) Notwithstanding the presence of
real physical injury or symptoms, the court concluded that recovery should be allowed:
Although plaintiff's symptoms are less severe than those in
Okrina and Purcell, we hold under the circumstances of this
case that he has stated a prima facie case. The trial court
upheld the jury's verdict finding that the "unique nature of
the accident in this case [resolves] all doubts of the genuineness of the claim."JJ2

The court concluded that the unusually disturbing experience suffered by the plaintiff, along with the physical symptoms, which consist of anxiety in about half of the flights he
takes, manifested by physical problems, including "adrenaline
surges, sweaty hands, elevated pulse and blood pressure"))3
108. Id. at 442.
109. For a detailed discussion of intentional infliction of emolional distress, see
infra Part III.
110. (blill, 361 N.W.2d al 443.
Ill. /d.
112. Quill v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Cl. App. 1985),
review denied, (Minn. Apr. II, 1985).
113. Id. al 441.
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establish that his claim was real. 114 "The nature of that experience guarantees plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress
during the descent and the emergency detour to Detroit."1l5
Thus, the court justified its holding in Qp,ill, not because of
the seriousness of the physical manifestations but because of
the surrounding circumstances. To the court, the surrounding
cirucmstances provided strong evidence that the claim was
genuine, even though the plaintiff's physical manifestations
did not appear to rise to the level of the physical harm as in
Purcell, Okrina; or Leaon. Accordingly, the reference to Qp,ill in
Leaon raises a question concerning the continuing legitimacy of
the physical manifestation requirement.
The more recent court of appeals decision of Silberstein v.
Cordie raised the same issue. 116 In Silberstein, the family members, who survived the murder of the family father while they
were in an adjacent room from where the murder took place,
all alleged varying degrees of emotional distress:
After her husband's killing, Bonnie Silberstein experienced
insomnia, loss of appetite, headaches and muscle tension
for several months. Presently, she still is fearful about being alone and loud noises elevate her pulse and fill her with
a "sense of dread." After the incident Bonnie's daughter
required medical treatment for abdominal pain and constipation, started biting her nails and developed highly sensitive skin. Bonnie's son experienced blurred vision,
dizziness and stomach problems. He also has become
afraid of the dark. These symptoms plainly raise fact issues
as to the manifestation of physical injury""
The Silberstein court cited Qp,ill to support its conclusion that
the emotional distress claim could survive a motion for summary judgment. 118 Even where the symptoms appear to constitute less than the "physical disability" initially required by
Purcell and Okrina, the court concluded that the surrounding
circumstances in both Qp,ill and Silberstein legitimized the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress. In Silberstein, the family
members heard five shots from a shotgun and the murderer,
while carrying the shotgun, twice entered the bedroom where
114. Id. at 443.
115. Id.
116. Silberstein v. Cordie, 474 N.W.2d 850, 852-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
117.ld.at857.
118. Id.
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the other family members were. 119 The facts not only confirm
the argument that the family members were within the zone of
danger but also that the emotional distress suffered was real.
Taken together, Qpill and Silberstein may provide the bridge
from the physical disability requirement to a rule allowing recovery for emotional distress absent physical injury, so long as
the surrounding circumstances provide proof of the emotional
distress. Failure to recognize the court's shift in focus makes
these two decisions difficult to explain. At the very least, the
cases raise questions concerning the value of the physical injury requirement as the primary means of determining whether
a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress is
legitimate.
The California Supreme Court has also considered the continuing validity of its "nervous shock rule," the counterpart to
Minnesota's physical manifestation rule. In Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals,120 the court stated that "if a plaintiff has
suffered a shock to the nervous system or other physical harm
which was proximately caused by negligent conduct of a defendant, then such plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from
such a defendant for any resulting physical harm and emotional distress."121 Prior to Molien, California did not permit
recovery of damages for emotional distress absent physical injury if the emotional distress arose from negligence.
California's nervous shock rule derived from Sloane v. Southern California Railway,122 an 1896 California Supreme Court
case. The Molien court also noted that the rule apparently "has
been immutable since its early origin, with virtually no regard
for the factual contexts in which claims arose, or the alleged
causes of emotional distress, or the prevailing state of medical
knowledge." 123
The Molien court had several problems with the physical injury requirement. First, the court concluded that the requirement was both underinclusive and overinclusive in light of the
purpose for the requirement. If screening false claims is the
basis for the requirement, the rule is underinclusive because it
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 853.
616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
44 P. 320 (Cal. 1896).
Molirn, 616 P.2d at 818.
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screens out claims that might otherwise be valid even without
proof of physical injury. The rule is also overinclusive by permitting claims where the injury is minor or trivial. 124 Second,
the Molien court found that the nervous shock requirement
"encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony."125 And, third, the court could not discern a clear distinction between physical injury and emotional injury. 126
In conclusion, the Molien court determined that the distinction between physical and psychological injury was a false
Issue:
The essential question is one of proof; whether the plaintiff
has suffered a serious and compensable injury should not
turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classification
scheme. We thus agree with the view of the Rodrigues court:
"In cases other than where proof of mental distress is of a
medically significant nature, the general standards of proof
required to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. This
standard is not as difficult to apply as it may seem in the
abstract. As Justice Traynor explained in this court's unanimous opinion in State Rubbish Collectors Ass 'n v. SiliznoJ!, ...
the jurors are best situated to determine whether and to
what extent the defendant's conduct caused emotional distress, by referring to their own experience. In addition,
there will doubtless be circumstances in which the alleged
emotional injury is susceptible of objective ascertainment
by expert medical testimony .... To repeat: this is a matter
of proof to be presented to the trier of fact. 127

The Minnesota Court of Appeals has already indicated a
weakening of the physical manifestation requirement in its
Qpill and Silberstein opinions. Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme
Court could readily justify abandoning the physical manifestation requirement based on the policy reasons that justified the
departure in Molien.
III.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In 1983, in Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., 128 the
124. /d. at 820.
125. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813,820 (Cal. 1980).
126. /d.
127. /d. at 821 (citing Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970); State

Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznolf, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (citations omitted).
128. 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983).
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Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate and independent
tort. Prior to Hubbard, Minnesota allowed recovery of damages
for emotional distress in situations where the plaintiff was not
specifically threatened with physical injury but nonetheless suffered emotional distress as a result of intentional action taken
by the tortfeasor. This section provides a brief history of judicial treatment of emotional distress claims prior to Hubbard, a
more detailed explanation of the supreme court's adoption of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in that
case, and an examination of some of the cases that have followed Hubbard. These subsequent cases illustrate the appellate
courts' punctilious adherence to its guidelines. Finally, this
section will analyze the legitimacy of the rigid guidelines the
courts have applied in thwarting intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
A. Judicial Treatment of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
pre-Hubbard: A Short History

Prior to Hubbard, the supreme court historically treated emotional distress claims sympathetically. Yet, the court's willingness to countenance emotional distress claims was balanced by
carefully maintained limitations on the right to recover.129 In
Lesch v. Great Northern Railway Co., 130 the plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendant's trespass and search
of her personal property. The trespass and search were committed by two employees of the railroad, who were searching
for railroad property.131 The plaintiff's husband was an employee of the railroad. The defendant's employees entered her
yard and house, without permission. The plaintiff watched the
two men as they walked from room to room and looked
through a trunk and some boxes. The men did not make any
threats or engage in any acts of violence, and the facts
129. See Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926). TheJohnson
court noted:
[Tlhere is always a possibility of trumped. up claims if there may be a recovery when no evidence of bodily injury can be discovered immediately. However, the matter is in the control of the trial courts and verdicts for plaintiffs
for any substantial amounts, when based chiefly on proof of subjective
symptoms, will not usually be allowed to stand.
/d. at 207, 208 N.W. at 816.
130. 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906).
131. /d. at 505, 106 N.W. at 956.
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presented indicate that the men had no intent to cause the
plaintiff injury or to interfere in any way with her person. I !l2
The court described the plaintiff's emotional state as
follows:
She was frightened by their acts, and immediately after they
left she became sick, feverish, her head ached, she trembled,
and had spells of vomiting. She was obliged to go to
bed, and was confined to her bed most of the time for about
two weeks, and was not well for a considerable time
afterwards. I !I !I

The defendant argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover because there was no indication that the fright was the
result of any legal wrong committed against her. 1!l4
With no differentiation in principle between cases involving
negligent and intentional conduct, the court held that, in order
to recover for fright, the fright must be "the proximate result
of a legal wrong against the plaintiff by the defendant." 1!l5 The
court found that the plaintiff had established the necessary
"legal wrong" in two ways: First, the defendant's employees
interfered with the plaintiff's peaceful enjoyment of her home,
in which she had an interest, even though her husband held
legal title to the house. Second, the defendant's employees interfered with the plaintiff's clothing. The court concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that the employees had committed a tort against the plaintiff. 136
The defendant also argued that the plaintiff's fright and illness were not proximately caused by the two employees. 137
Again, the court disagreed:
It is a matter of common knowledge that fright may, and

often does, affect the nervous system to such an extent as to
cause physical pain and serious bodily injury. The acts complained of in this case were, if committed, an outrageous
invasion of the sanctity of the home and the constitutional
rights of the citizen, well calculated to frighten the wife and
mother left alone in charge of her home. Whether she was
frightened by such acts, and whether her illness, which im132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
97 Minn. at 505-06, 106 N.W. at 956-57.
Id. at 506, 106 N.W. at 957.
Lesch v. Great N. Ry., 97 Minn. 503,106 N.W. 955 (1906).
Id.
Id.
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mediately followed, was the proximate result of such acts,
were questions of fact for the jury. 138
In 1926, in Johnson v. Sampson!39 the plaintiff, a fifteen-yearold high school girl, alleged that the defendants came to her
schoolhouse, took her into a separate room, and questioned
her about her sexual activities. 140 The defendants accused her
of having sexual intercourse with various men, which she truthfully denied. 141 Additionally, the defendants told the fifteenyear-old that if she did not confess, she would be sent to reform school. She alleged that she suffered great mental
anguish as a result of their actions and received a nervous
shock that permanently impaired her health. 142
Further, the plaintiff alleged that the facts made out a claim
for assault, but the supreme court found the assault claim untenable, since there was no threat of physical violence. However, the court concluded that the complaint stated a cause of
action for damages involving the wrongful "invasion of plaintiff's legal right." 143
Citing an earlier opinion, 144 the Sampson court stated that the
law will not permit recovery for a wrong unless the act had an
effect upon the plaintiff's person, property, or other legal interest. 145 However, the Sampson court also recognized that.
"wherever there is a wrongful act which infringes on a legal
right, even though no physical harm was done or threatened,
there may be a recovery, if mental suffering was a proximate
result of the act."146
The court in Sampson distinguished cases involving negligent
infliction of emotional distress, where fright was the only consequence, stating that "in such cases there is no element of
wilful [sic] wrong."147 The court concluded that a willful
wrong should lead to recovery:
On the whole we see no good reason why a wrongful invasion of a legal right, causing an injury to the body or mind
13S.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 506-07, 106 N.W. at 957.

167 Minn. 203, 20S N.W. S14 (1926).
/d. at 204, 20S N.W. at SIS.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207, 20S N.W. at S16.

Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 311, 50 N.W. 23S, 239 (IS91).
Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 205, 20S N.W. S14, SIS (1926).
Id. (citation omitted).
/d. at 206, 20S N.W. at SIS.
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which reputable physicians recognize and can trace with
reasonable certainty to the act as its true cause, should not
give rise to a right of action against the wrongdoer,
although there was no visible hurt at the time of the act
complained of. Of course, there is always a possibility of
trumped-up claims if there may be a recovery when no evidence of bodily injury can be discovered immediately.
However, the matter is in the control of the trial courts, and
verdicts for plaintiffs for any substantial amounts, when
based chiefly on proof of subjective symptoms, will not usually be allowed to stand. 148
Thus, the court concluded that the defendants violated a statutory prohibition against accusations of fornication and invaded
the plaintiff's "legal right to be secure in her reputation for
virtue. . . ." 149
Assuming the facts to be true, the plaintiff stated a claim not
only for slander but also for the intentional and wrongful acts
of the defendants that resulted in both physical injury and
mental suffering. In addition, the surrounding circumstances
made it likely that a person in the plaintiff's position would be
shocked and would suffer some degree of emotional· harm and
"would be likely to do harm to her nervous system."150 The
court found the defendants intended to harm the plaintiff. 151
In Schuh v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 152 the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota foreshadowed the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Hubbard.
Schuh involved a workplace harassment claim. The plaintiff alleged that his employer attempted to terminate him in order to
cancel the plaintiff's insurance benefits before he became permanently disabled. The plaintiff alleged that he suffered severe mental anguish and nervous disability as a result of the
defendant's actions. 153
The court found that the defendant did not intentionally
cause the plaintiff's mental or physical breakdown nor did it
intend to aggravate the plaintiff's condition. 154 Moreover, the
148. [d. at 207, 208 N.W. at 816.
149. [d.

150. Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208, 208 N.W. 814, 816 (1926).
151. [d.

152. 96 F. Supp. 400 (D. Minn. 1950).
153. [d. at 401-02.
154. [d. at 402.
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court found no threatened physical injury to the plaintiff. 155
The district court concluded that any aggravation of plaintiff's
health by the defendant's conduct was necessarily a result of
the plaintiff's worrying or concern, which in tum caused the
plaintiff's breakdown. 156
The district court recognized prevailing Minnesota law,
which disallowed recovery for fright resulting in physical injuries "in the absence of contemporaneous injury to the plaintiff,
unless the fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong
against the plaintiff by the defendant."157 In the absence of a
clear interpretation of the "legal wrong" requirement by Minnesota courts, the district court interpreted the phrase to mean
"the invasion of some legal right of another."158
The Schuh court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a legal wrong. Absent a showing that the defendant intentionally caused the plaintiff's mental breakdown or a showing
that the defendant should have known his conduct created an
unreasonable risk that distress would occur and result in illness
or bodily harm,I59 the plaintiff could not recover.
In 1979, in Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., 160 the Minnesota Supreme Court presaged its opinion
in Hubbard. Haagenson involved an insurer's failure to pay nofault benefits. The court appeared to intimate that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress would be an independent tort, given appropriate facts; however, the court
stopped short of adopting intentional infliction of emotional
distress as an independent tort. 161
B.

Hubbard v. United Press International: Minnesota's
New Tort

Finally, in 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate
and independent tort. 162 In Hubbard v. United Press Interna155. /d.
156. /d.

157. Schuh v. Prudential Ins. Co., 96 F. Supp. 400, 403 (D. Minn. 1950) (citing
Sanderson v. Northern P. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 168, 92 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1902».
158. [d.
159. [d.

160. 277 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. 1979).
161. [d. at 652.
162. [d. at 653.
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tional,163 a discharged employee brought claims of retaliatory
discharge, discrimination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. l64 Although the supreme court adopted the
tort o( intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court denied relief, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the plaintiff's recovery under the newly adopted tort. 165
1.

Basis for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

As the basic formulation for the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the court adopted section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of TortS. 166 Section 46 provides that
"[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."167
Against the backdrop of its conservative common law approach to damages for emotional distress, the Hubbard court
noted:
Hubbard's argument that his independent claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be given full
recognition raises the issue of whether contemporaneous
physical injury or the allegation of malicious conduct sufficient to constitute an underlying tort is critical to that claim
or whether a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress can stand alone as a separate cause of action. Our past
reluctance to provide a direct remedy through the recognition of an independent tort reflects a policy consideration
that an independent claim of mental anguish is speculative
and so likely to lead to fictitious allegations that there is a
considerable potential for abuse of the judicial process.
Although our support of the policy of protecting the judicial
process from trivial and speculative claims by restricting
tort recoveries for mental distress is undiminished, we no
longer feel that a rule requiring physical injury or an underlying tort is the most effective way to promote this policy.
Rather, it is the view of this court that the problems inherent in allowing recoveries for mental and emotional disturbances can be more clearly and adequately addressed if
163. 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
164. /d. at 430.
165. Id. at 438-39.
166. Id. at 439.
167.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 46(1) (1965).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized as a
separate and independent tort. Accordingly, we believe it is
appropriate to recognize it in Minnesota at this time. 168
2.

Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The court established four elements that the plaintiff must
prove in order to prevail in an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim: "(1) the conduct must be extreme and
outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3)
it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be
severe. "169
The Hubbard court defined "extreme and outrageous" to
mean that the conduct has to be "so atrocious that it passes the
boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized
community."17o In addition, "severe emotional distress" requires distress that "is so severe that no reasonable [person]
could be expected to endure it." 171
The court clearly expressed its intent to circumscribe the
new tort's role in Minnesota tort law:
168. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). The
court specifically noted that it did not adopt subsection (2) of section 46, which deals
with the right of bystanders to recovery for the intentional or reckless infliction of
emotional distress. /d. at 439 n.8.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965) provides:
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
Id.
Given the fact that the court requires some physical manifestation of the emotional distress in all cases, it seems clear that a claimant would be entitled to recover
for that physical manifestation, or bodily harm, under the Minnesota formulation,
even if the language of subsection (2) is not specifically adopted. The theory of bystander recovery in subsection (2) should not conflict with Stadler v. Cross, 295
N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980), because the defendant's conduct must be intentional or
reckless, rather than simply negligent, in order for the claimant to be entitled to
recover. The right to recover for emotional distress under either subsection (I) or
(2) does not in any event depend on whether the claimant is in the zone of danger.
That concept is not a necessary condition to the imposition of liability under § 46.
169. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 438-39.
170. Id. at 439 (quoting Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 n.3 (Minn. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
171. 330 N.W.2d at 439 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j
(1965)).
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In explaining both the extreme nature of the conduct necessary to invoke this tort, and the necessary degree of severity
of the consequent mental distress, the Restatement's commentary emphasizes the limited scope of this cause of action, and clearly reflects a strong policy to prevent fictitious
and speculative claims. Because this policy has long been a
central feature of Minnesota law on the availability of damages for mental distress, our adoption of the Restatement
formulation as the standard for the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not signal an
appreciable expansion in the scope of conduct actionable
under this theory of recovery. The operation of this tort is
sharply limited to cases involving particularly egregious
facts. 172

3.

Standards for Measuring Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress

The facts in Hubbard provided a basis for the supreme
court's denial of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. They also established a standard against which
subsequent claims for emotional distress have been measured
and routinely denied. The plaintiff's claim failed both because
the defendant's conduct was not deemed extreme and outrageous and because the emotional distress was not severe
enough. 173 In Hubbard, the plaintiff was disciplined by his employer, both verbally and in writing. In reviewing all the actions of the employer, the court concluded that as a matter of
law, the employer's actions were neither extreme nor outrageous. Additionally, the court found that the employer's actions did not rise to the level of conduct that is "utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." 174 Lacking proof of
these two elements, the court also <;oncluded that the evidence
of emotional distress was insufficient to sustain the plaintiff's
claim:
[T]he primary evidence of Hubbard's emotional distress
was his own testimony that "because of" UPI's conduct he
"had been depressed," that he had become "physically ill in
terms of throwing up, and had stomach disorders," and that
he had developed a skin rash and high blood pressure. De172. 330 N.W.2d at 439 (citation omitted).
173. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 (Minn. 1983).
174. [d. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 emt. d (1965».
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spite this testimony about his problems, Hubbard never
missed work, never filed a claim for workers' compensation,
and never saw a doctor until June 1980, and went then only
because he had the flu. Medical evidence as to Hubbard's
injuries is conspicuously absent from the record. The extent of the "injury" proven by this record does not exceed
that of any employee who experiences an employer's criticism or reproof concerning job performance. Accordingly,
the jury should not have been permitted to find that the distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. 175

The stringent standard adopted by the court for evaluating
emotional distress claims, coupled with its careful scrutiny of
the record and its admonition to trial courts to do the same,176
provides trial and appellate courts with the mandate and authority to rigidly limit emotional distress claims. Courts have
followed this mandate and concluded with little difficulty that
recovery should be denied as a matter of law in emotional distress cases, either because the defendant's conduct was not
sufficiently extreme and outrageous 177 or because the plain175. Id. at 440 (citation omitted).
176. Id. at 440 n.9.
177. See, e.g., Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986). As
previously discussed, the plaintiff in Leaon was humiliated at a stag party organized by
four Washington County deputies. The supreme court disallowed the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Citing the elements established in
Hubbard, the court concluded:
The trier of fact could find that the incident at the stag party was outrageous
and intentional, and also, perhaps, that the incident caused at least Donald
Leaon severe emotional distress. As a matter of law, however, we hold that
events occurring after the party do not qualify as extreme and outrageous.
Id. at 873. The court of appeals took the same position in Saltou v. Dependable Ins.
Co., 394 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Saltou, the insured, a veteran who
suffered from a service-related nervous condition, and a mentally impaired companion with whom he was living and planned to marry, sued his insurer and its agents for
wrongfully delaying payment of insurance benefits to him to cover damage to his
mobile home. As a result of the delay in payment the plaintiffs claimed that they
suffered both financial hardship and emotional injury. Mr. Saltou "lost weight, was
put on valium, and had to go to [a crisis center] several times for emotional
problems." The plaintiffs' suit alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress,
fraud, and unfair and discriminatory insurance practices. The plaintiffs requested
both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 631-32.
The trial court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims. The court of
appeals affirmed on two bases. First, the court held that "the failure to pay an insurance claim in itself, no matter how malicious, does not constitute a tort; it constitutes
a breach of an insurance contract." /d. at 633. Because the plaintiff is required to
establish an independent tort, and the court concluded that the facts were insufficient
to support the claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As to
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tiff's emotional distress was not severe enough!'s

C.

Illustrative Applications of the Hubbard Standards

Much of the rigidity of the Minnesota law governing claims
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has developed in breach of contract and employment discharge cases,
although that analysis has spilled over into other areas as well.
This section examines illustrative cases arising in breach of
contract, employment discharge, sexual abuse, and defamation
cases.
1.

Breach of Contract and Employment Discharge Claims

Minnesota's rigid approach to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims has also developed parallels in breach of
the emotional distress claim, the court said that "[a]lthough bad faith failure to pay
insurance claims is not to be encouraged, and respondents took advantage of appellants' vulnerable mental and economic condition, appellants must show more than
malicious failure to pay an insurance claim in order to recover extra-contractual damages." Id.
178. See, e.g., Born v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 16, 1988). In Born, the wife of the deceased insured
brought suit against the insurer for failure of the insurer, the insurer's agent, and a
related company for failure to pay insurance benefits under the policy. Mr. Born
misrepresented to the company his health condition at the time he applied for and
obtained the policy coverage. When the company discovered that he had preexisting
medical problems, the company rescinded the policy and provided a full premium
refund, along with an explanation of the reasons for the rescission. The Borns did
not cash the refund check. Two months later, they received a computer-generated
letter stating that because the six-month waiting period for coverage of preexisting
medical conditions had expired, Mr. Born was now covered for any preexisting medical conditions. The coverage letter was sent erroneously. Medico subsequently refused to pay any claims, arguing that the policy was null and void.
The insured's spouse, acting as personal representative of her husband's estate,
brought suit against various defendants, alleging breach of contract and separate
claims for negligence and waiver of forfeiture. She brought a claim on her own behalf for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Following a jury trial, the jury, by answer to the special verdict form, found that
Medico had waived its right to rescind the policy, that all parties were causally negligent, that the plaintiff was entitled to contract damages and damages for her own
pain and suffering, and that Mr. Born materially represented his health history. The
trial court reduced Ms. Born's recovery by her percentage of fault, entered judgment
against the defendants, and denied all post-trial motions.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the plaintiff did not establish her claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that there was no evidence establishing that Medico's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Because of
the material representation, the company had a right to rescind. In addition, the
court held that the plaintiff did not "present medical testimony to substantiate any
concrete physical manifestations of physical distress." Id. at 590.
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contract and employment discharge cases. In cases involving
breach of contract claims, the non-breaching party may allege
various injuries flowing from the breach. Because the contract
measure of damages is typically limited, the plaintiff will generally not include damages for mental suffering. 179 For example, in cases involving breach of an insurance contract,
damages are limited to "the loss that naturally and proximately
flows from the breach."180 In Haagenson v. National Farmers
Union Property & Casualty Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that "in the absence of specific statutory provision ...
extra-contract damages are not recoverable for breach of contract except in exceptional cases where the breach is accompanied by an independent tort,"181 and, that "[a] malicious or
bad-faith motive in breaching a contract does not convert a
contract action into a tort action." 182
Faced with the limitations on recoverable damages imposed
by contract law, the non-breaching party will typically attempt
to broaden the recoverable damages by alleging various
torts-e.g., defamation, intentional interference with contractual relations, or the negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress-along with claims for punitive damages. 183
These tort claims are usually not successful and reflect the
courts' unwillingness to expand the historically limited remedies and damages available for breach of contract.
In employment cases, the results are the same. Claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation are
increasingly common in cases where the employer discharges
an employee or otherwise takes action affecting the employee's
job status. Whether the claim is for defamation 184 or the in ten179. See Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47,51,114 N.W. 353, 354 (1907).
The Beaulieu court noted that mental anguish, while properly an element of damages
in some tort actions, is "to be considered in actions for breach of contract in exceptional cases only." Id.
180. Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979) (finding that an
insurer's liability for refusal to pay benefits includes liability for lost profits that are a
direct and proximate result of the breach).
181. 277 N.W.2d 648,652 (Minn. 1979).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
184. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990). In Wing, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the relationship between common law tort
claims and claims brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The plaintiff had
been harassed by a co-employee on numerous occasions. The store managers were
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tional infliction of emotional distress, 185 the Minnesota
Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand tort remedies to
supplement the traditional contract remedies available to discharged employees. One of the factors that appears to be at
work in cases such as Hubbard, even if not explicitly stated, is
the desire to avoid that expansion. Several appellate decisions
illustrate this reluctance post-Hubbard. 186
Cases involving contract breaches and employment discharges present difficult issues, whether the tort claims are
based on defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress, because, as the courts have recognized, every employment discharge involves some emotional distress. 187 To avoid
opening the floodgates and readily converting contract claims
and employment discharges into tort claims, the court has required the plaintiff to prove distress over and above that experienced by employees who are discharged. A discharge in
and of itself cannot be deemed extreme and outrageous.
However, the rigid approach to claims for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has transferred into other areas,
even where the claims do not involve contract breaches or emaware of the problem but took no steps to correct it. In addition, the co-employee
who had been harassing the plaintiff accused the plaintiff and other store employees
of theft. At an open meeting called by management, the plaintiff and other accused
employees were fired, after indirectly being accused of theft. The plaintiff recovered
compensatory damages for defamation, but the court held that punitive damages
could not be awarded because the employer had a subjective good faith belief that
the theft charges were accurate. Id. at 381.
185. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
186. See, e.g., Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991) (involving employment discharge; intentional infliction of emotional distress disallowed, but plaintiff permitted to recover
under other theories, including defamation and reprisal discrimination); Lund v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review
denied, (Minn. Mar. 26, 1991) (pertaining to a manager's notes of a meeting with
workers that reflected adversely on plaintiff); Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Comm'n,
428 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (involving an employee's promotion which
was delayed because the employee was charged with making harassing phone calls);
Cafferty v. Garcia's of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (employee discharge); Ecklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (employee discharge).
187. See Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, No. 0-1090, 1992 WL
388116 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1992) (noting that while in some instances an employment
termination may be accompanied by extreme and outrageous behavior sufficient to
satisfy § 46, "there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine if an employer's public statement of the reason for termination was, so long as the employee
disputed that reason, in and of itself some evidence" of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
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ployment discharges. Two recent cases illustrate the rigidity of
the court's approach in other areas.
2.

Sexual Abuse Cases

In Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 188 the plaintiffs were an adult who was a child-victim of sexual abuse by a
priest and the victim's parents. The defendants were the
priest's Archdiocese and Diocese. The parents sued the Archdiocese alleging, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The victim sued the Archdiocese and Diocese for
negligently allowing the priest to sexually abuse him when he
was a minor. 189
The jury awarded the victim compensatory and punitive
damages. Yet the trial court remitted the punitive damage
award, a decision which was affirmed by the court of appeals.
In addition, the trial court dismissed the parents' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, also affirmed by the
court of appeals. 190
Repeating its previous characterization of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a "disfavored tort,"191 the court
of appeals acknowledged that the "emotional distress suffered
by the parents was significant."192 Nonetheless, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim because the proof
was insufficient to overcome the "high threshold standard of
proof required of a complainant before [the issue] may be submitted to ajury."193
3.

Defamation

In Strauss v. Thorne,194 the plaintiff sued the defendant-physician and his clinic for defamation because of statements made
suggesting that the plaintiff was abusing her children. The
plaintiff's suit was based on defamation and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court
188. 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), reuiew denied, (Minn. May 24, 1992).
189. Id. at 810.
190. Id. at 814.
191. /d. at 813-14 (citing Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d
371, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
192. Mrozka, 482 N.W.2d at 813.
193. Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 813
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), reuiew denied, (Minn. May 24, 1992).
194. 490 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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granted summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals reversed as to the defamation and negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims l95 but sustained the trial court's
grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Noting the "high standard of proof needed for an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim,"196 the court of appeals agreed with the trial
court that the defendant-physician's conduct "could not be
considered extreme or outrageous by reasonable standards."197 The court of appeals also agreed that the plaintiff
"failed to show manifestations of severe emotional distress" as
a result of the defendants' actions. The court of appeals concluded that "[g]eneral embarassment, nervousness and depression are not in themselves a sufficient basis for a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 198
D.

Are the Guidelines Appropriate?

While contract breaches, employment discharges, or employer discipline of an employee invariably involve emotional
distress claims, the courts' reluctance to readily allow recovery
in those cases is understandable. Something over and above
the action that an employer typically takes in discharging an
employee has to be established. But establishing the range of
normal-or at least "tolerable"-conduct may be accomplished more readily in employment situations than other
claims. A baseline of conduct that has to be tolerated in contract breach and employment discharge cases is easily discernible by courts. Too, a court's conclusion that an employer's
conduct is not extreme and outrageous when it consists of
195. Although there was a qualified privilege, the trial court held that there was
insufficient evidence of malice to take the issue of abuse to the jury. The court of
appeals reversed.
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was also reversed because it was supported by the defamation
claim. However, the court's conclusion is questionable in light of Covey v. Detroit
Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). Emotional distress
need not be established by a separate negligence theory. Rather, in Covey, it was an
offshoot of the defamation claim. Negligence becomes superfluous under the circumstances. [d.
196. [d. at 913 (citing Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 823
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988».
197. /d. at 913.
198. [d. at 913 (citing Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum, 351 N.W.2d 371, 379
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, (Minn. Nov. I, 1984».
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usual or standard practices in discharging an employee is more
palatable than a bold assertion that conduct "could not be considered extreme or outrageous by reasonable standards."199
The standard used to determine "severe emotional distress"
element also presents problems. The Restatement's discussion of the "severe emotional distress" requirement is as
follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
emotional distress has in fact resulted, and where it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various names, such
as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous
shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and
nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises.
Complete emotional tranquillity is seldom attainable in this
world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional
distress is a part of the price of living among people. The
law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be
proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous
character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important
evidence that the distress has existed .... 200
In applying this standard, Minnesota cases seem to have magnified the Restatement's standard that the distress be "so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
it." While the Hubbard court adopted that standard as a baseline, in application, the courts have required not only physical
manifestations but also corroborating medical testimony.201
Getting back to the basics, it seems clear that the supreme
court did not intend to impose a physical injury requirement in
cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. Hubbard imposed no such requirement. Hubbard was
reaffirmed in Pikop v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. 202 In
Pikop, the court stated that "[i]n order to recover for the in ten199.
(Minn.
200.
201.
1988),
202.

This was the court's conclusion in Strauss v. Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908, 913
Ct. App. 1992).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt.j (1965) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Born v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. Ct. App.
review denied, (Minn. Nov. 16, 1988).
390 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1986).
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tional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff need not establish any physical injury, for the action seeks to compensate
purely emotional injuries resulting from intentional acts."203
In Johnson v. Morris,204 the plaintiff brought suit against two
police officers, a deputy sheriff, and the cities and county that
employed them. The plaintiff's claims stemmed from his
arrest and restraint and an allegation that one of the officers
shot at the plaintiff's truck tires after the plaintiff left the vehicle. In addition to a claim for violation of his civil rights, the
plaintiff alleged common law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery, and the intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. 205 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.206 The
supreme court affirmed except for the assault claim.207
The court noted that the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim required the plaintiff to establish that the defendants' "conduct was extreme and outrageous, intentional
or reckless, and that it caused severe emotional distress. "208
However, the court held that the plaintiff failed to "demonstrate the level of distress needed as an element of this type of
cause of action. His 'signs and symptoms of depression' fall far
short of being that type of distress which 'no reasonable man
could be expected to endure ... .' "209
In Hubbard, the court held that the degree of the plaintiff's
emotional distress and supporting proof were insufficient to
justify recovery. And, although the court said that "[m]edical
evidence as to Hubbard's injuries is conspicuously absent from
the record,"210 it did not impose a medical evidence requirement
as an element of the prima facie case of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 211
203. /d. at 754.
204. 453 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 1990).
205. /d. at 32-33.
206. /d. at 33.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 41.
209. Id. (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 436 (Minn. 1983».
210. Hubbard v. United Press InCI, 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 (Minn. 1983).
211. The situation is analogous to the court's position on feasible alternatives in
strict liability design defect cases in products liability litigation. In Kallio v. Ford
Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987), the court rejected the defendant's argument that proof of a feasible alternative should be an element of the plaintiff's case:
Although normally evidence of a safer alternative design will be presented
initially by the plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases. Such evi-
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There are aberrations and some apparent confusion over the
standards, however, as is to be expected in areas where the law
is still being worked out. There are two good examples.
The first is Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,212 in which the
court of appeals concluded that the supreme court did not intend for the Hubbard standard to apply in negligent infliction
cases, both because the supreme court did not indicate in Hubbard that the requirements of intentional infliction of emotional distress were to replace other torts in which damages for
emotional distress are claimed, and second, because the
supreme court in recent cases such as Langeland, referred to
"physical symptoms" without suggesting that claimants have
to meet Hubbard standards. The court of appeals in Quill
viewed the zone of danger rule as providing "an indicia of genuineness the intentional tort requirements lack."213 The court
perceived the standards for intentional infliction of emotional
distress to be harsher in requiring stronger proof of emotional
injury than in negligence cases.
In the second decision, M.H. v. Caritas Family Services,214 the
supreme court has recently indicated that the court of appeals
may have been incorrect in its view of the two torts. In Caritas,
the supreme court held that public policy does not preclude an
action for negligent misrepresentation against an adoption
agency that undertook to provide information concerning the
genetic background of a child's genetic parents and then negligently failed to disclose information in a way that misled the
adoptive parents.
The court also held that the record did not support the claim
of intentional misrepresentation and that, without the claim of
intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress could not stand. In discussing the emotional
distress claim the court said that
Infliction of emotional distress, whether intentional or negligent,
generally requires plaintifft to suffer a physical injury as evidence of
dence is relevant to, and certainly may be an important factor in, the determination of whether the product was unreasonably defective. However,
existence of a safer, practical alternative design is not an element of an alleged defective product. design prima facie case.
[d. at 96-97 (citation omitted).
212. 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 18, 1985).
213. Q!.lill, 361 N.W.2d at 443.
214. 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
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their severe emotional distress. . . . Because plaintiffs have al-

leged no physical injury resulting from their alleged emotional distress, their motion to amend was properly denied
unless they alleged a "direct invasion" of their rights by
"willful, wanton, or malicious conduct. ... " There is no evidence of such a direct invasion of plaintiffs' rights, or of
willful, wanton, or malicious conduct on the part of Caritas.
Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Caritas deliberately misled them, much less wantonly did SO.215
The court's statement in Cantas is inconsistent with the court's
prior rejection of the physical injury requirement in Hubbard
and Pikop. The court may simply have blurred the lines between physical injury arising out of emotional distress and
physical manifestation of emotional distress, or the court's
statement may be a reflection of the fact that the physical injury requirement from the negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases is in reality the same as the physical manifestation requirement in the intentional infliction of emotional distress cases. Either way, the court's opinion is understandable.
The lines may have also been blurred in the negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. While the court has framed
the requirement in negligent infliction cases as a "physical injury" requirement, the court has also discussed the required
proof of physical injury as a "physical manifestation" requirement. For example, in Leaon v. Washington County,216 the court
upheld a trial court's dismissal of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff "failed to show
physical manifestations of emotional distress."217
If the common ground for both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress cases is a "physical manifestation" requirement, the decisions become easier to understand.
Whether the enhanced requirements are justifiable is a different question. The Restatement's theory is that the surrounding circumstances are the best indicator of whether the
claimant has sustained severe emotional distress. In addition,
the same concerns that other courts have expressed over the
retention of the physical injury requirement in negligent infliction cases apply at least in part to claims for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The questionable link between
215. [d. at 290 (emphasis added).

216. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986).
217. [d. at 875.
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physical manifestations and emotional distress, and the potential unreliability of medical testimony linking emotional trauma
to a certain occurrence should be concerns in the intentional
infliction cases as well.
The greater concern is that the guidelines the supreme court
has established for intentional infliction of emotional distress
may have become more than guidelines, however, in application by the lower courts and court of appeals. These guidelines appear to have become "shackles."218 At the very least, it
is arguable that the severe emotional distress requirement
should not be viewed as an insurmountable requirement provable only by physical manifestations confirmed by medical evidence. Instead, scrutiny of the record to determine whether
under all the circumstances the plaintiff has a legitimate claim
for severe emotional distress seems more consistent with the
initial guidelines established by the supreme court.
In Hubbard the court specifically noted that it did not adopt
subsection (2) of section 46, which deals with the right of bystanders to recover for the intentional or reckless infliction of
emotional distress. 219
218. See John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term "Result-Oriented" to Characteriu Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984). Justice Simonett states in his

article that "[I]egal rules are a powerful restraint on result-oriented decisions, but
there must still be enough elasticity in the rules to allow for the law's evolution. The
rules are guides, not shackles." Id. at 203.
219. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). In
Dornfeld v. Oberg, 491 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), the court was presented
with a novel issue involving the right of a plaintiff to recover for emotional injury that
was produced by fear for the safety of another. In Dornfeld, the plaintiff was waiting in
the car while her husband of three days changed a tire on their car. A driver of
another vehicle crossed the northbound lanes of the highway and hit the Dornfeld
vehicle, striking Mr. Dornfeld and dragging him 200 to 230 feet down the highway,
killing him. Ms. Dornfeld was thrown around the inside of the vehicle but suffered
no physical injury. The driver of the other vehicle was aITested. A blood test revealed a blood alcohol content of .224. Id. at 299.
Following the accident, Ms. Dornfeld was unable to concentrate, had serious migraine headaches, had an ulcer attack, and had a flare-up of ileitis. . . . [S]he was
unable to sleep, had memory problems and had nightmares, including flashbacks of
the crash. She sought counseling for her problems, but her condition did not improve. Dornfeld has been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
as a result of the accident. Id.
She brought suit against the driver of the other car and her underinsured motorist carrier, alleging both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The jury returned a verdict finding that the plaintiff "was in the zone of physical
danger at the time of the accident, that she reasonably feared for her own safety at
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Subsection (2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
provides:
the time, but that she did not suffer severe emotional distress as a result of her fear
for her own safety." Id.
The jury awarded the plaintiff $230,600 in compensatory damages for the distress she suffered because she was present at the accident scene and witnessed her
husband's death. Concluding that the plaintiff had a valid claim for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on
the verdict against the driver of the other car. The court determined later that the
plaintiff's policy with American Family provided her $100,000 in underinsured motorist insurance coverage. That determination was also affirmed by the court of appeals. Id. at 302.
The defendants argued on appeal that permitting recovery by Dornfeld would
require the court of appeals to create a new cause of action. The court of appeals
disagreed, concluding that recovery "is warranted by application of an established
body of Minnesota tort law." Id. at 300.
The court then said that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hubbard
merely corrected the physical injury requirement prior Minnesota cases had
imposed on persons seeking to recover for emotional distress. Hubbard did
not limit the development of the law up to that time. Minnesota has long
allowed recovery to persons within the zone of danger. Recovery was denied in Stadler solely because the plaintiffs were not within the lOne of danger, thus implying that if the plaintiffs had been within the lOne of danger,
recovery would have been permitted.
Id..
In a footnote, the court noted that the New York Court of Appeals had adopted
the lOne of danger rule but permitted a claim for emotional harm under similar circumstances. [d. at 300 n.1 (citing Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984».
Recovery was predicated on the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The potential impediment to allowing recovery under a negligence theory is
the jury's finding that the plaintiff "reasonably feared for her own safety at the time"
of the accident but that she did not suffer severe emotional distress as a result of her
fear for her own safety. For a discussion of the impact of negligence theory on recovery under such circumstances, see supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
Dornfeld thus appears to straddle two lines of cases, one permitting recovery for
the plaintiff where the plaintiff's emotional distress is fear for her own safety if she is
in the lOne of danger and the other denying recovery to a bystander who fears for the
safety of another. In Dornfeld, the plaintiff's claim does not fit squarely within either
line of cases. The plaintiff is in the zone of danger, but her emotional distress is the
product of fear for the safety of another. And, although the plaintiff suffers emotional distress as the result of fear for the safety of another, she is not a bystander so
as to fall within the line of cases prohibiting recovery solely on that basis.
The court of appeals avoided the dilemma by applying § 46 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS. The critical issue is whether the common law should permit
recovery in cases where the plaintiff is in the lOne of physical danger created by a
defendant's reckless misconduct, suffers emotional distress severe enough to constitute bodily harm within the meaning of the Restatement and physical harm within the
meaning of the Minnesota zone of danger cases, but where the emotional distress
and physical consequences are the product of fear for the safety of her husband.
Given the jury's findings, the result could be supported either by the application of
general negligence principles or by § 46 of the Restatement.
In general, § 46 provides an alternative theory of recovery in cases where the
plaintiff suffers emotional distress but, because of inability to satisfy the lOne of dan-
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Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor
is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family
who is present at the time, whether or not such distress
results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if
such distress results in bodily harm. 22o
Given that the court requires a showing of some physical
manifestation of the emotional distress in all cases, it seems
clear that a claimant would be entitled to recover for that physical manifestation or for bodily harm, under the Minnesota formulation, even if the language of paragraph (2) is not
specifically adopted. Less clear is what position the court
might take on the issue of whether a bystander should be entitled to recover under paragraph (2), without being in the zone
of danger.
Section 46 applies to a person who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another and for any bodily harm that results.
Where the defendant's conduct is directed at a third person,
the defendant is subject to liability if the defendant "intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress . . . to a
member of such person's immediate family who is present at
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm,
or ... to any other person who is present at the time, if such
distress results in bodily harm."
Comment i addresses the state of mind issue:
The rule stated in this Section applies where the actor
desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where
he knows that such distress is certain, or substantially cerger requirement, would ordinarily be denied recovery under a negligence theory. In
cases where the defendant's conduct is reckless, the plaintiff may meet the requirements of § 46. In particular, if the defendant is driving while intoxicated, the theory
may justify bystander recovery. In this situation, Minn. Stat. § 169.21 provides further support for the claim of recklessness. This statute requires submission of the
punitive damages issue to the jury in cases where evidence shows that an "accident
was caused by a driver (1) with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more, (2) who
was under the influence of a controlled substance, or (3) who was under the influence
of alcohol and refused to take a test required under section 169.123(2) .... " MINN.
STAT. § 169.21 (1992). Proof of "deliberate disregard" of the rights or safety of an
injured person would surely satisfy the standard for reckless behavior.
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965).
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tain, to result from his conduct. It applies also where he
acts recklessly, as that term is defined in § 500, in deliberate
disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional
distress will follow. 221
Liability follows if the defendant acts intending to cause the
severe emotional distress and where he acts "in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow."
Comment I explains the bystander recovery provision:
Where the extreme and outrageous conduct is directed at a
third person, as where, for example, a husband is murdered
in the presence of his wife, the actor may know that it is
substantially certain, or at least highly probable, that it will
cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. In such
cases the rule of this section applies. The cases thus far decided, however, have limited such liability to plaintiffs who
were present at the time, as distinguished from those who
discover later what has occurred. The limitation may be
justified by the practical necessity of drawing the line somewhere, since the number of persons who may suffer emotional distress at the news of an assassination of the
President is virtually unlimited, and the distress of a woman
who is informed of her husband's murder ten years afterward may lack the guarantee of genuineness which her presence on the spot would afford. The Caveat is intended,
however, to leave open the possibility of situations in which
presence at the time may not be required.
Furthermore, the decided cases in which recovery has
been allowed have been those in which the plaintiffs have
been near relatives, or at least close associates, of the person attacked. The language of the cases is not, however,
limited to such plaintiffs, and there appears to be no essential reason why a stranger who is asked for match on the
street should not recover when the man who asks for it is
shot down before his eyes, at least where his emotional distress results in bodily harm.222
The right to recover for emotional distress under either paragraph in section 46 does not in any event depend on whether
the claimant is in the zone of physical danger. Although the
theory of bystander recovery in the second paragraph should
not conflict with Stadler, because the defendant's conduct must
221. [d. § 46 ernt. i.
222. /d. § 46 ernt. 1.
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be more culpable-intentional or reckless-rather than simply
negligent in order for the claimant to be entitled to recover. If
the difference in culpabity is insufficient to justify a different
treatment for bystanders who seek to recover for intentionally
or recklessly inflicted emotional distress, the second paragraph
will not present an advantage, unless the physical manifestation requirement is dropped.
Where the claimant seeks to establish that she is entitled to
recover based not on the defendant's intent to cause severe
emotional distress but rather the defendant's recklessness, the
Restatement standards governing reckless misconduct have to
be consulted, particularly in light of the potential paradox created by the comparison of section 46 to the sections that govern reckless misconduct.
Section 500 of the Restatement defines reckless disregard of
the safety of another:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent. 223

Comment d covers cases involving claimants who are in the
zone of danger:
If the actor's conduct is such as to involve a high degree of
risk that serious harm will result from it to anyone who is
within range of its effect, the fact that he knows or has reason to know that others are within such range is conclusive
of the recklessness of his conduct toward them. It is not,
however, necessary that the actor know that there is anyone
within the area made dangerous by his conduct. It is
enough that he knows that there is strong probability that
others may rightfully come within such zone. 224

Section 501 of the Restatement states that, subject to two
exceptions covering causation 225 and defenses,226 "the rules
which determine the actor's liability to another for reckless dis223.
224.
225.
226.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

§
§
§
§

500.
500 cmt. d.
501(2).
503.
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regard of the other's safety are the same as those which determine his liability for negligent misconduct. "227 The
Restatement, therefore, funnels claims based on reckless misconduct through the usual negligence rules to determine when
a defendant is subject to liability. The right to recover, therefore, still hinges on the acceptance of the Hambrook approach
in negligence cases.
The contradiction seems to exist because section 500, requires that the plaintiff be within the zone of danger, whereas
section 46 does not. However, the provisions may be reconcilable because sections 500 and 501 involve cases where there is
a threat of physical injury to the plaintiff, making it logical to
apply negligence rules as the baseline to determine whether
recovery should be allowed. Conversely, where the defendant's conduct threatens the plaintiff with serious emotional
harm, it is arguable that section 46 should control, and that the
plaintiff should be entitled to recover, as a bystander, without
being in the zone of danger, upon establishing that the defendant acted recklessly in causing the plaintiff severe emotional
distress.
IV.

STATUTORY ACTIONS, TORT CLAIMS,
AND WRONGFUL DEATH

Given the rigidity of the Hubbard guidelines, it is important
to determine whether alternative theories of recovery may permit a claimant's recovery for emotional injury without meeting
the Hubbard guidelines.
A.

Statutory Actions

In cases where no underlying tort justifies an award of damages for emotional suffering, the Hubbard standards may still be
circumvented where the legislature has created a statutory
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 501 (1965). The two exceptions are in
subsection (2) of § 501 and § 503 of the Restatement. Subsection (2) reads as
follows:
(2) The fact that the actor's misconduct is in reckless disregard of another's
safety rather than merely negligent is a matter to be taken into account in
determining whether a jury may reasonably find that the actor's conduct
bears a sufficient causal relation to another's harm to make the actor liable
therefor.
Id. Section 503 governs defenses, taking the position that ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim of reckless misconduct, although the plaintiff's
own reckless misconduct would be a defense.
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cause of action. The statutory action may either provide directly for the award of damages for mental suffering,228 or may
provide a statutory action for civil damages without mentioning damages for emotional suffering. In the latter case, the
statutory action itself may be deemed the same as an underlying tort in order to justify damages for emotional suffering
without meeting the Hubbard standards.
1.

Minnesota Human Rights Act Claims

In cases involving discrimination or harassment in employment, an aggrieved employee may have different paths to pursue. The employee may proceed with an administrative claim
of discrimination or harassment against the employer under
the Minnesota Human Rights Act,229 or the employee may
bring a civil claim against the employer.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act applies to discrimination
or harassment based on sex, including "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical
contact or other verbal or physical conduct or communication
of a sexual nature when ... that conduct or communication has
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive employment . . . environment. "230 The Act also applies to discrimination based on "race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, ... marital status, status with regard to public
assistance, membership or activity in a local commission, disability, or age."231 The Act makes it a violation for an employer
"to discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or
privileges of employment. "232
Damages available under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
include compensatory and punitive damages. The court may
also award damages for "mental anguish or suffering."233
In State v. Mower County Social Services,234 the court found that
the rigid standards established by the Hubbard court in in ten228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.15 (1990).
/d.
[d. § 363.01(41)(3).
[d. § 363.03(1)(2).
/d. § 363.03(1)(2)(c).
[d. § 363.071(2).
434 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. Cl. App. 1989).
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tional infliction of emotional distress claims do not have to be
met in order for damages for "mental anguish or suffering" to
be awarded under the Human Rights Act. 235 The lesser standard for the award of damages for mental anguish or suffering
will be justified even absent proof of the elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 236
The facts in Mower County provide a good illustration of the
differences in standards of recovery. The plaintiff alleged that
her employer passed her over for permanent employment as a
clerk-typist because of her pregnancy and marital status. 237
The administrative law judge concluded that the employer had
discriminated against the plaintiff and awarded her damages
for backpay and medical expenses that would have been covered by insurance had she been hired. In addition, the judge
awarded the plaintiff $2,000 in damages for mental anguish
and suffering and $2,000 in punitive damages. 238
The administrative law judge justified the damage award by
finding that the plaintiff had become "frustrated, angry and depressed" after the county rejected her application. 239 The
judge also noted that the county's rejection aggravated her relationship with her husband and others, and her "experience
in having to ask her former co-workers for welfare was
degrading.' '240
The county argued that the evidence was insufficient to justify a damage award for emotional suffering under Hubbard,
which requires severe emotional distress caused by egregious
circumstances. The court of appeals held that the Hubbard
standard was inapplicable:
In Hubbard, the supreme court concluded the plaintiff could
not recover damages for mental distress because the plaintiff's distress was not sufficiently severe or caused by "particularly egregious facts." Hubbard is distinguishable on two
grounds. First, the plaintiff in Hubbard asserted an independent tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in addition to his employment discrimination
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
1989).
240.

434 N.W.2d at 499-500.
Id.
[d. at 496.
Id. at 497.
State v. Mower County Social Serv., 434 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mower County, 434 N.W.2d at 497.
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claims. The claim for mental anguish in Hoy's case is based
on statutory law rather than common law. Second, at the
time of the Hubbard suit, the Human Rights Act did not allow damages for mental anguish or suffering. 241
The court of appeals found substantial evidence in the record
to support the findings of the administrative law judge's award
of damages for mental anguish. The court emphasized the fact
that the claimant was awarded $2,000 in punitive damages
under circumstances where the defendant's acts showed a
"willful indifference to the rights or safety of others. "242 Based
upon that finding, the court of appeals concluded that "the
county's conduct was sufficiently severe to also cause Hoy compensable mental anguish and suffering."243
The court of appeals, affirming the judgment, emphasized
the egregious nature of the defendant's actions and deemphasized the severity of the emotional distress. A comparison
of the analysis in Hubbard and Mower County illustrates that a
gap exists between fact patterns that may justify a common law
claim for emotional distress, on the one hand, and those that
justify a claim under the Human Rights Act, on the other.
2.

Polygraph Examinations

Asl<.ing a person to take a polygraph test may give rise to a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
Kamrath v. Suburban National Bank,244 the plaintiff's employer
asked her to take a polygraph test, a request that violated state
law. The polygraph statute in effect at the time read: "No employer or agent thereof shall directly or indirectly solicit or require a polygraph, voice stress analysis, or any test purporting
to test the honesty of any employee or prospective employee."245 The statute also contained a specific provision authorizing civil remedies:
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any
person injured by a violation of this section may bring a civil
action to recover any and all damages recoverable at law,
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
gender
law.

Id. at 499-500 (citation omitted).
Id. at 500.
Id.
363 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
MINN. STAT. § 181.75(1) (1984). The statute was amended in 1986lO remove
specific references. That amendment did not change the substance of the
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together with costs and disbursements, including costs of
investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, and receive
other equitable relief as determined by the court. 246
The facts in Kamrath arose out of a police investigation of
certain missing deposits from a local McDonald's restaurant.
The local police asked several McDonald's employees to take a
polygraph test,247 and, in addition, two of the bank's tellers
who were not suspects in the case. The plaintiff was one of the
tellers. The plaintiff testified that a bank vice-president asked
her to take the test, telling her that she could refuse. 248
Several days after she took the test, she began experiencing
problems. She began to have nightmares. Family members
testified that "she became more withdrawn, gained weight, and
was very tired. "249 The plaintiff sought neither counseling nor
medical treatment for her problems. 25o
At her attorney's request, the plaintiff was later examined by
a psychiatrist. Although initially skeptical that a polygraph test
could have such a strong impact, the psychiatrist determined
that the plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.
A professor of psychiatry and psychology testified that someone with the plaintiff's strongly religious background, with a
strong religious code that emphasized honesty, could react to
the test more severely than an average person. 251 To her, the
test was an accusation of dishonesty.252
The examining psychiatrist concluded that the plaintiff had a
"15% permanent emotional disability based on (1) her emotional inability to work at any job involving handling money,
and (2) her increased dependence on her husband, resulting
from her inability to express her feelings and develop close relationships with others."253 The jury found that the bank
asked the plaintiff to take the test and that the bank's conduct
directly resulted in harm to her. The jury awarded her
246.
247.
248.
249.
1985).
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. § 181.75(4).
Kamrath, 363 N.W.2d at 110.
/d.

Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'} Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. Ct. App.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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$60,000 in damages. 254
The trial court in the case refused to instruct the jury on the
theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress or to grant
a new trial on the basis that the jury was not required to find
that the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
existed before awarding damages. 255 The bank argued that,
absent a physical injury, the plaintiff had to meet the Hubbard
requirements in order to recover for emotional distress. The
court of appeals rejected the argument:
Traditionally a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for
mental distress without a physical injury unless there is
some conduct constituting a direct invasion of her rights,
such as slander, libel, malicious prosecution, willful, wanton
or malicious misconduct. Hubbard recognizes the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
adopts elements intended to ensure that a tort actually occurred and that injury was intentionally inflicted. 256

Because of the underlying statutory cause of action, the court
of appeals concluded that "harm of the type Kamrath suffered,
based in emotional distress, flows naturally from the act constituting the underlying tort. "257
3.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

In Venes v. Professional Service Bureau, Inc. ,258 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff who was subjected to
debt collection practices that violated the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act was entitled to recover damages for emotional distress. 259 The plaintiffs in the case received harassing
phone calls from a collection agency that was attempting to
collect certain debts for the Mayo Clinic. 260 The jury awarded
the plaintiff $6,000 for emotional distress. On appeal, the
court considered whether the evidence was sufficient to justify
a finding that the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous. 261
254.
1985).
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. Cl. App.

Kamrath, 363 N.W.2d at Ill.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 112.

353 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. Cl. App. 1984).
Id. at 675.
Id. at 673.
/d.
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The trial court instructed the jury that, to recover for emotional distress under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the
plaintiff had to establish the elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 262 The court of appeals concluded that the jury could have found that the collection
agency's conduct "exceeded its legal rights and recklessly or
intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress" upon the
plaintiff. 263 The court did not discuss the severity of the plaintiff's emotional distress. The plaintiff testified that the
agency's conduct had threatened, insulted, and irritated him,
and that "the stress of the calls and the litigation aggravated
his preexisting medical problems, such as migraines, ulcers
and his spastic bowel syndrome."264 Whether such testimony
would support an award under the specific standards of Hubbard is questionable.
The more interesting, and more difficult, question raised by
Venes is whether a plaintiff who asserts a violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, or any other statute that establishes a specific remedy for its violation, should be entitled
to recover damages for the emotional injury sustained by the
violation, even if the Hubbard standard for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is not met.
Venes and Kamrath appear to conflict on this question when
the statute does not directly provide for damages. The Human
Rights Act is not part of the conflict, because that Act specifically provides for the award of damages for mental anguish
and suffering. Venes indicates that, if damages for emotional
distress are to be recoverable, the Hubbard standards must be
met,265 while Kamrath indicates to the contrary.
The Federal Debt Collection Practices Act provides a civil
remedy for "any actual damage sustained by such person as a
result of such failure."266 The polygraph statute from Kamrath
also provides a specific civil remedy for "any and all damages
recoverable at law."267 Consistency should dictate a uniform
approach to the question of statutory causes of action that do
262.
263.
1984).
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 674.
Venes v. Professional Servo Bureau, 353 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn. Cl. App.
[d. at 673.

[d. at 674.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(l) (1988).
MINN. STAT. § 181.75(4) (1990).
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not specifically provide for the award of damages for mental
anguish and suffering.
In Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,268 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
noted that although the term "actual damage" in the Federal
Debt Collection Practices Act is not defined, plaintiff's right to
damages "should tum on whether or not he would be entitled
to collect damages, were this a cause of action for the intentional infliction of mental distress."269 Although the court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover minimal damages
for emotional suffering,270 it is not clear why the court tied the
right to recover to state law requirements for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
In Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc. ,271 the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota held that a plaintiff
was entitled to recover damages for emotional suffering for
harassing phone calls. The plaintiff's husband was awarded
damages for loss of consortium. 272 The facts of the case suggested that the emotional distress was minimal and likely
would not meet the requirements for an independent claim for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 273 The actual
damages in the case were relatively small. 274 A psychologist
testified:
[The plaintiff] was no longer childlike in her happiness, that
she had lost her interest in housework, that she was not
paranoid, but distrustful of telephones. That her sleep was
disturbed, she had nightmares, headaches, a sensitive stomach, and was prone to cry. He accepted her statements at
face value and despite her obvious physical problems, concluded without further investigation that all her physical
problems were psychosomatic, and caused by the wrongful
acts of the telephone collectors. . . . Peggy herself testified
that after the first call she "cried and cried and cried and
cried. "275

The trial court concluded that "she suffered no permanent ill
268. 502 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
269. [d. at 470.
270. [d. at 471.

271. 505 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.D. 1981).
[d. at 875.
[d. at 866-70.
[d. at 875.

272.
273.
274.
275.

[d.
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effects from the experience of the calls, and that most of her
crying was habitual or cosmetic. However, she is of the group
to be protected and she has suffered injury."276 The trial court
awarded her damages of $1,000, and her husband $100. 277
If Venes is based upon the conclusion that the Federal Debt
Collections Practices Act includes only the damages that are
recoverable under an independent tort claim under state law,
then Venes appears to be consistent with Carrigan. However,
there is no clear reason why the damage must be so limited.
An alternative explanation of Venes is that the case was submitted to determine whether the elements of intentional infliction
of emotional distress were satisfied. The issue of whether
those elements had to be satisfied was not before the court in
Carrigan.

As the court intimated in Bingham, the damages, whatever
they are, are compensable where evidence supports the claim.
The legislative judgment that a debt collector who engages in
the prohibited conduct should be responsible for the harm
caused should be a sufficient basis to justify an award of damages for emotional distress, regardless of whether the independent state standards for intentional infliction of
emotional distress are satisfied. If so, then Kamrath would state
the prevailing rule that recovery for an emotional injury is allowed for an express statutory violation.
B.

Interference with Family Relationships

The Minnesota Supreme Court has long emphasized the importance of family relationships.278 The court has recognized
two types of family rights: "(1) those of the members of the
276. Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 875 (D.N.D. 1981).

277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 402,37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1949).
In Miller, the court stated:
As a practical proposition, the family is in large measure a self-governing
unit so far as concerns its internal affairs. From a social point of view it is
also a most important one. It is the foundation of civil society, sanctioned as
such by both civil and ecclesiastical authority. It provides not only shelter,
food, comfort, family life, happiness, and security for its members, but also
instruction in, and example of, virtue, morality, and character. ... Human
society could not endure without it. Among the rights of the members of a
family as against the world are those of having the family maintained intact
without interference by outsiders. . .. In the Heck case, it was held that not
only "every member" of the family has a "right" to protect family rights
against outside interference (there criminal conversation with the wife), but
that the state also has an interest in the protection thereof. This right is
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family among themselves, and (2) those of the members of the
family as against the world. "279 Further, the court has attempted to protect these relationships by permitting tort
claims for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, or enticing a parent to abandon a child, and by barring tort claims
by family members against each other via the application of
intrafamily tort immunities. 280
The demise of the intrafamily tort immunities and the
supreme court's adoption of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress have created new opportunities for lawsuits
by family members against each other. However, the statutory
abolition of alienation of affections actions 281 and the supreme
court's refusal to recognize a new tort of interference with custodial relationships may act as a brake on expanded tort recoveries against persons who interfere with family relationships.
Marriage dissolution is an additional factor to consider. The
law is not clear on the issue of whether an emotional distress
action is barred in a dissolution action and whether the judgment in a dissolution action extinguishes any claim for emotional distress.
Several types of claims may be brought by family members
for emotional distress. The abolition of family tort immunities 282 leaves open the possibility of intrafamily tort claims for
emotional distress by family members against each other. Subject to statutory and common law restrictions, family members
may also have tort claims for emotional distress against third
persons who interfere with family relationships. Interference
with family relationships may occur in a variety of situations,
including cases where family relationships are upset by outsidprotected also under the constitution of the United States against outside
interference even by government.
!d. (citations omitted).
279. !d. at 401,37 N.W.2d at 544.
280. Id. at 402, 37 N.W.2d at 545.
281. MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1990).
282. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (abolishing parental
immunity, overriding the exceptions retained by the court for acts involving the exercise of reasonable authority and acts involving the exercise of ordinary parental discretion concerning food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other
care previously retained in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631
(1968)); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969) (abolishing interspousal tort immunity); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966)
(abolishing immunity of unemancipated child from action by parent for negligent
driving of motor vehicle).
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ers who disrupt or destroy those relationships and in post-dissolution cases where a noncustodial parent interferes with the
custodial parent's relationship with the child. 283 Although the
abolition of family tort immunities has created the possibility
of increased tort liability, mitigating factors against expansion
exist, including the legislature's judgment that actions for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation are inimical
to the best interests of the state and should be abolished. 284
Claims for emotional distress run headlong into these limitations. The issue may be whether the presence of an underlying
claim or the legislative or judicial prohibition of such a claim
should preclude assertion of a claim for the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress to circumvent the limitations on claims for abuse of family relationships.

1.

Intrafamily Claims for Emotional Distress

In Beaudette v. Frana,285 the Minnesota Supreme Court abolished interspousal tort immunity but not without reservations:
There is an intimate sharing of contact within the marriage
relationship, both intentional and unintentional, that is
uniquely unlike the exposure among strangers. The risks of
intentional contact in marriage are such that one spouse
should not recover damages from the other without substantial evidence that the injurious contact was plainly excessive or a gross abuse of normal privilege. The risks of
negligent conduct are likewise so usual that it would be an
unusual case in which the trial court would not instruct the
jury as to the injured spouse's peculiar assumption of
risk. 286
While abolishing the interspousal tort immunity, the court advises caution in approaching the issue of tort recovery by suggesting a threshold of "plainly excessive" action or action that
is a "gross abuse of normal privilege."287
Instead of focusing on the "privilege" that one spouse may
have to engage in tortious conduct with respect to the other
spouse, a court should focus on whether the tort claims of as283. See Sharon McDonnell Dobbs, Tort Recovery for Intentional Inteiference with Custodial Rights in Minnesota, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1159 (1991).
284. MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1990).

285. 285 Minn. 366,173 N.W.2d 416 (1969).
286. Id. at 372-73, 173 N.W.2d at 420.
287. Id.
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sault and battery have been established. In cases involving extreme and outrageous conduct by one spouse against the
other, the question should be whether the facts establish the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Assault and
battery are predicated on threatened contact or unconsented
contact while intentional infliction of emotional distress focuses on extreme and outrageous conduct. Those requirements are arguably sufficient guarantees against abuse of the
marital relationship and should suffice to sort out meritless
claims. Where the claim is for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the requirements of extreme and outrageous conduct should preclude action for the usual distress inherent in family relationships. The requirements should also
offset and highlight action that causes an impermissible level of
emotional distress to a family member.288
Actions for dissolution of a marriage may complicate the picture when one spouse sues another for torts committed during
the marital relationship. No Minnesota cases have resolved the
issue of whether tort claims may be brought in conjunction
with a dissolution action or whether the tort claims may be
barred by the dissolution. Although Minnesota eliminated
fault as a requirement for dissolution in 1974,289 fault may still
provide the basis for a tort claim by one spouse against another. 290 A tort claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress could be joined with the dissolution action,291 or
it could be litigated separately, subject to the court's admonition in Beaudette v. Frana. 292
A court has several options when confronted with a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with
a dissolution action. The court might conclude (1) that the dis288. For example, the outrageous conduct element of intentional infliction of
emotional distress barred claims brought by spouses who sought recovery for emotional distress allegedly brought on by the other spouse's adultery. See Strauss v.
Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991).
289. See Act of March 14, 1974, ch. 107, § 4, 1974 Minn. Laws 157 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 518.06 (1971».
290. See ROBERT E. OLIPHANT, MINNESOTA FAMILY LAw PRIMER § 47.5 (3d ed.
1991) (suggesting that a claim for domestic assault may be combined with the divorce
action "with a reasonable expectation of recovery-even if it is 'his' portion of the
homestead.") .
291. MINN. R. CIV. P. 18.
292. 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969).
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solution action extinguishes the claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress if the claim is based on the same ground
that justified the dissolution;293 (2) that the claim for intentional infliction is incompatible with the dissolution action because it resurrects fault-based dissolution and creates the same
problems that the legislature intended to avoid by removing
fault as a basis for dissolution;294 (3) that the claimant is barred
because he or she has failed to meet the standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress;295 or (4) allow the claim
even when unaccompanied by physical injury.296
In Stuart v. Stuart,297 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
a judgment in a marital dissolution did not bar a subsequent
suit for intentional torts, including the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, committed during the marriage. The court
concluded that the legal principles underlying "res judicata,
equitable estoppel and waiver" did not bar recovery.298
The court also concluded that joinder of the tort claims in
the dissolution action was not required:
If an abused spouse cannot commence a tort action subsequent to a divorce, the spouse will be forced to elect between three equally unacceptable alternatives: (1)
Commence a tort action during the marriage and possibly
endure additional abuse; (2) join a tort claim in a divorce
action and waive the right to ajury trial on the tort claim; or
293. See, e.g., Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 761 (S.D. 1989). The Pickering court stated that "[w]e believe the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be unavailable as a matter of public policy when it is predicated on
conduct which leads to the dissolution of a marriage." [d. The court also barred the
plaintiff's claims for fraud and deceit. [d.
294. See Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
295. See Strauss v. Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). See also
Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73, (Ky. Ct. Ap. 1989); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 607-08 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991); Wiener v. Wiener, 444
N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546 (Or. 1978).
296. See, e.g., Ruprecht, 599 A.2d at 606. The Ruprecht court noted:
This court is not satisfied that a flood of litigation with fraudulent claims or
the resurrecting of fault, or the possibility of confusing the issues of custody,
support, and equitable distribution should deny one spouse from suing the
other in a divorce proceeding for emotional distress without physical injury.
There is no valid policy interest nor logical reason to allow one spouse to
sue the other for physical injury but not for emotional distress absent physical injury. Certainly mental and emotional distress is just as "real" as physical pain.
Id. See also Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 811 P.2d
575 (N.M. 1991).
297. 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988).
298. [d. at 507.
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(3) commence an action to terminate the marriage, forego
the tort claim, and surrender the right to recover damages
arising from spousal abuse. To enforce such an election
would require an abused spouse to surrender both the constitutional right to a jury trial and valuable property rights
to preserve his or her well-being. This the law will not do.
Although joinder is permissible, the administration of
justice is better served by keeping tort and divorce actions
separate .... Divorce actions will become unduly complicated if tort claims must be litigated in the same action. A
divorce action is equitable in nature and involves a trial to
the court. On the other hand, a trial of a tort claim is one at
law and may involve, as in this case, a request for ajury trial.
Resolution of tort claims may necessarily involve numerous
witnesses and other parties such as joint tortfeasors and insurance carriers whose interests are at stake. Consequently,
requiring joinder of tort claims in a divorce action could unduly lengthen the period of time before a spouse could obtain a divorce and result in such adverse consequences as
delayed child custody and support determinations. The
legislature did not intend such a result in enacting the divorce code. 299

2.

Interference with the Custodial Relationship

In 1978, the legislature abolished actions for alienation of
affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of
promise to marry:
Actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to
marry, have been subject to grave abuses, have caused intimidation and harassment, to innocent persons and have
resulted in the perpetration of frauds. It is declared as the
public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of these
causes of action. 30o
In Bock v. Lindquist,30I the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to recognize a parent's claim against a third party for
alienation of a child's affections. While not banned by the statutory prohibition on alienation of affections actions because
299. /d. at 508, (quoting Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 637-38 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (citations omitted)).
300. MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1990).
301. 278 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1979).
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the statute had not yet become effective, the court found the
legislative history strong enough to justify a ban on the action
as contrary to public policy.302
However, the court in Bock limited its holding:
Nothing in this opinion diminishes other remedies for interference with familial relationships, remedies which make actions for alienation of affections unnecessary as well as
undesirable. Violations of judicial orders establishing custodial or visitational rights in one parent may in appropriate
situations be corrected by habeas corpus or, more commonly, by citation for contempt of court. Actions for defamation, enticement, or contributing to the delinquency of a
minor remain available against a stranger who meretriciously intrudes into a family relationship.303

In Larson v. Dunn,304 the supreme court considered the question of whether it should recognize a new tort for the intentional interference with parental custodial or visitation rights.
The plaintiff brought suit against his ex-spouse as well as members of her family who allegedly aided her in hiding their
daughter. 305 The plaintiff, who had permanent legal custody,
searched for his daughter for seven years. 306 After his daughter was returned to him, he commenced suit against his exspouse and her relatives for interfering with his custodial
rights. 307 The court of appeals recognized the tort of interference with custodial rights:
One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent,
abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to
leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return
to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability
to the parent. 308

The court of appeals concluded that the aggrieved parent
would be entitled to recover for the following damages: (1)
damages for lost society of the child; (2) damages for emotional distress; (3) damages for the lost services of the child; (4)
expenses incurred in reasonable efforts to locate the child; and
302. !d. at 328.
303. [d. at 328.

304. 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990).
305. [d. at 41.
306. [d. at 42.
307. [d.

308. Larson v. Dunn, 449 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting RE§ 700 (1977».
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(5) reasonable expenses incurred in treatment of the child. so9

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. slO The court's reasons for rejecting the tort centered around the common theme
of protecting the best interests of the child, who is already subject to significant emotional injury as a result of the marital
breakup leading to the custody problems. The court recognized the potential for the abuse of the tort as a new weapon in
family disputes. sll Creating a new tort would create a new
wrong, placing innocent children in the middle of lawsuits between parents. S12 "For the good of our children, the law
should seek to promote such harmony as is possible in families
fractured by the dissolution process. At a minimum, the law
should not provide a means of escalating intrafamily
warfare. "s 1S
In addition, the law already provides redress for a custodial
parent whose rights are infringed. s14 The parental kidnapping
statute provides for an award of costs incurred by the custodial
parent in recovering the child. s15 However, this restitution
does not compensate for emotional injury associated with deprivation of a child's presence.
The court also noted that "emotional distress could possibly
be recovered in egregious cases through the independent tort
ofIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress."316 In addition,
309. 449 N.W.2d at 756-58.
310. /d. at 758.

311. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990). The Larson court noted its
prior opinion in Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1979). The Bock case
involved a claim for alienation of a child's affections after the legislature had abolished alienation of affections actions. The Bock court rejected the claim:
The circumstances under which the right has here been asserted demonstrate the potential for grave abuses, in which a child becomes the object of
intrafamily controversy and, indeed, a pawn in disputes over monetary matters. In the more usual case of marriage dissolution resulting in deteriorated relationships, a cause of action by one parent against another for
alienation of a child's affections would exacerbate the unhappy relationships
and become a strategic tool for advantageous use of one family member
over another.
Id. at 327-28.
312. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46.
313. /d.
314. /d. The court referred to MINN. STAT. § 61IA.04(1) (1990), which states that,
before a sentencing or dispositional hearing, the court may consider a crime victim's
request for restitution.
315. See MINN. STAT. § 609.26(4) (1990).
316. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990) (citing Hubbard v. United
Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983)).
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the supreme court held that "Minnesota already recognizes the
action for lost services of the child."!l17 However, the compensation for loss of a child's services will not include the broader
element of loss of consortium, which is limited to cases where
one spouse claims damages because of injury to the other.!l18
The Larson court also concluded that the tort would not deter parental abduction and that it would result in a proliferation oflitigation.!l19 In conclusion, the court held: "Expanding
the adversarial process to include this new tort is contrary to
the best interests of children and will only intensify intrafamily
conflict growing out of marriage dissolution without deterring
parental abduction. "!l20
While Larson qualifies Bock by foreclosing a specific action for
interference with custodial rights, the court nonetheless left
open the possibility of an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.!l21 The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is both narrower and broader than the tort of
intentional interference with custodial rights. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is broader because the tort may
be utilized by noncustodial parents. The tort is narrower because it requires proof of severe emotional distress; the tort of
interference with custodial rights does not.
The difference in the interests protected by the two torts
also means that the damages are different. Under the custodial
claim, the plaintiff-parent is entitled to recover damages for
317. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46. The Larson court referred to Eichten v. Central
Minn. Power Ass'n, 224 Minn. 180, 195,28 N.W.2d 862, 871 (1947), which recognized a parent's right to recover for loss of a child's services, even though the evidence of the loss is "indirect, hypothetical, and to some extent speculative."
318. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 1982).
319. 460 N.W.2d at 47.
320. [d.
321. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn 1990). The supreme court's opinion is somewhat equivocal. After indicating that the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress would be available in "egregious" cases, the court also stated that
while "the conduct in this case is egregious, and done in defiance of a court order,
the proper remedy for such violation of the court's integrity lies in contempt and
other such sanctions; not in providing the other party with compensation." [d. The
court then referred to Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1979), noting that
the Bock court denied the parent recovery for alienation of a child's affections, partially because the action was prospectively abolished by statute and the availability of
other remedies made the action unnecessary. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46. However,
given the court's initial recognition of the availability of the action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress as a potential remedy in an appropriate case, it appears that the court did not intend to completely foreclose the action.
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the emotional distress flowing from the abduction, loss of the
child's society or services, and reasonable expenses the custodial parent may have incurred in regaining custody of the
child. 322 Under the emotional distress claim, the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover for emotional distress, but the
plaintiff must demonstrate severe distress. The tort of intentional interference with custodial rights does not require such
proof. While the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress provides an alternative, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is a less effective remedy than the tort of
intentional interference with custodial rights.
Use of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
in cases involving custodial rights will create problems based
on the degree of outrageousness necessary to establish a prima
facie case. Cases allowing the tort for interference with custodial rights bear out the problem. 323
Additional problems arise where the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based not on the interference
with custodial rights but on visitation rights. Most of the jurisdictions that have rejected claims for alienation of affections or
the intentional infliction of emotional distress for interference
with custodial rights have done so where the interference was
with visitation rights, short of complete removal of the child. 324
These jurisdictions have reasoned, similar to the Larson court,
that this use of the tort fosters neither the child's best interests
nor the best interests of the judicial system. 325 That reasoning
may be sufficient to establish a bright line between cases involving interference with custodial rights and those involving
visitation rights.
While Larson resolves the issue of intentional interference
with custodial rights, the problem of recovery for actions previously covered by alienation of affections actions remains. Two
potential claims for emotional distress may be brought in cases
previously covered by the tort of alienation of affections. The
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 cmt. g (1977).
323. See Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 684-85 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (deprivation of
custody for seven months sufficient to establish prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 433 (Vt. 1978) (deprivation of custody for one month held to state a prima facie case).
324. See Hershey v. Hershey, 467 N.W.2d 484, 488 (S.D. 1991).
325. See, e.g., Dymek v. Nyquist, 469 N.E.2d 659, 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Bhama
v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
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plaintiff may sue either for negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 326 The claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress is not exactly parallel to the alienation of
affections action, an action that courts have clearly held to be
an intentional tort. Additionally, assertion of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress would likely run afoul of
the zone of danger and physical disability requirements. The
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress presents
different problems.
It is unclear what position the Minnesota Supreme Court will
take with respect to the right to pursue a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in cases previously covered by
alienation of affections. The court's choice depends on
whether it will consider the legislative policy behind abolishing
the alienation of affections action strong enough to preclude
an emotional distress claim.
In an action for alienation of affections, an aggrieved spouse
was required to prove the following:
(1) That one spouse had the other spouse's affections until
defendant interfered; (2) that one lost the other's affections;
(3) that defendant took an active and intentional part in
causing the plaintiff-spouse's loss of affections; and (4) that
defendant acted willfully and intentionally.327
The "defendant's wrongful and intentional conduct" must
have been "the controlling cause of the estrangement between
plaintiff and his wife."328
The tort of alienation of affections is an intentional tort
based on the tort of enticement. 329 There is a strong element
of loss of consortium underlying the claim. 330 A showing of
negligence is insufficient to establish the tort. 331 "The acts
which lead to the loss of affection must be wrongful and intentional, calculated to entice the affections of one spouse away
326. Bhama. 425 N.W.2d at 734. A third potential claim would be loss of consortium. but. because the supreme court has recognized that the essence of the alienation of affections claim is loss of consortium. it does not seem likely that the·
consortium claim could circumvent the statutory limitation of alienation of affections
actions. See generally Larson v. Dunn. 449 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
327. Pedersen v.Jirsa. 267 Minn. 48. 52.125 N.W.2d 38. 41-42 (1963).
328. [d. at 52. 125 N.W.2d at 42.
329. [d. at 54. 125 N.W.2d at 43.
330. See Thill v. Modern Erecting Co .• 284 Minn. 508. 511. 170 N.W.2d 865. 868
(1969).
331. [d.
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from the other. "332
Notwithstanding the statutory abolition of the tort of alienation of affections, the possibility remains that the torts of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress could be
asserted. There are two potential approaches to the problem
with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
One is to bar the action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress where the claim is asserted against the defendant for
the same conduct that would have given rise to a claim for
alienation of affections prior to the statutory abolition of the
action. The other is to take the position the supreme court
took in Larson: the separate and independent tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is sufficiently distinct from the
disfavored action, such that it is actionable even though the
claim for alienation of affections is no longer assertable.
In Wilson v. Still,333 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held
that the statutory abolition of alienation of affections actions
precluded recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress:
Regardless of what the plaintiff calls her cause of action, she
has sued the defendant for wilfully taking away her husband. It could have been called "alienation of affections"; it
could have been called "seduction"; it could have been
called "criminal conversation." But all civil law suits under
those theories have now been prohibited. Can she proceed
on the theory of "outrage"? The law ... tells us she can
not. The plaintiff is asking us to allow a jury to find certain
conduct so outrageous as to be "regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community", when the legislative body freely elected from the same community has
expressly and deliberately, within our own generation, removed the acts complained of from those bearing civil liability in tort. We cannot accommodate the plaintiff without
doing grave insult to our legislators and those who elected
them. This we will not do. 334
The court's opinion in Wilson is typical of the rationale used by

courts denying the claim for emotional distress. 335
Other courts have concluded that the judicial or statutory
332. Pedersen v.Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 54-55,125 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1963).
333. 819 P.2d 714 (Okla. 1991).
334. Id. at 716.
335. See Christopher J. Whitesell, Note, Loss o/Consortium and Intentional Infliction 0/
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abolition of alienation of affections claims does not preclude
assertion of claims for the intentional infliction of emotional
Emotional Distress: Alternative Theories to Alienation of Affections, 67 IOWA L. REV. 859, 876
(1982).
In Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 533 A.2d 1358 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 537 A.2d 272 (Md. 1988), the court stated:
[A]bolition of the actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation does not preclude a person from maintaining a traditional breach of
contract action or a recognized tort action merely because the breach arose
from an improper liaison with the plaintiff's spouse or because one effect of
the alleged breach or tortious conduct was a disruption or breakup of his or
her marriage. . . . What is precluded ... is the refitting of the abolished
actions into other forms. One cannot sue to recover for injuries arising
from "defilement of the marriage bed" or from an interference with the
marriage by simply casting the defendant's conduct as a breach of contract,
or negligence, or some other intentional tort.
Id. at 1360.
In Homer v. Long, 599 A.2d 1193, 1201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), the court
held that a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress could not be asserted
in face of a legislative and judicial abrogation oftort actions for criminal conversation
and alienation of affections. In Homer, the plaintiff sued under various theories, including the intentional infliction of emotional distress, because a doctor had engaged
in sexual relations with the plaintiff's spouse while his spouse was a patient. [d. at
1194. The court denied the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
The court recognized that the doctor's conduct may have been extreme and outrageous and that the conduct violated clear standards established by the medical community, but the court noted that "the essence of the requirement is that the conduct
must not simply be extreme and outrageous from the perspective of society at large,
or from the perspective of someone else, but must be so as to the plaintiff. Outrageous conduct directed at A does not necessarily give B a cause of action." [d. at
1198. The court treated the claim as a bystander recovery case, denying the claim
because it has typically been limited to those plaintiffs who are present at the time of
the tortious action and who are known to be present by the defendant. /d. at 1199.
The court's rationale in barring recovery because the conduct is not intentional
as to the husband would, of course, bar virtually any emotional distress claim arising
out of interference with a family relationship, unless done in the presence of the
person making the claim, an unlikely probability. Knowledge to a substantial certainty that another will sustain injury should be sufficient.
While the court noted that some courts have relaxed the requirement in compelling cases, the court saw no reason not to apply the general rule:
The emotional and economic trauma likely to arise from the seduction of
one's spouse is not limited to the case where the seducer is the spouse's
therapist. The conduct may be just as outrageous and the harm may be just
as great where the seducer is a neighbor, a good friend, a relative, an employee or business associate of the plaintiff, or indeed anyone in whom the
plaintiff has imposed trust or for whom he or she has special regard. To
relax or abrogate the presence requirement in such cases would greatly expand the scope of the tort as framed and adopted by the Court of Appeals,
which we are unwilling to do.
[d. at 1199-1200; see also Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. 1991) (barring a
claim by a mother's husband against the biological father for concealing paternity
through application of a statute abolishing actions for criminal conversation, public
policy, and public policy underlying the statute).
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distress. ss6 The arguments for allowing the claim for emotional distress are stronger when one considers the differences
between the torts. Both the damages and elements of the
claims are different. SS7
Perhaps the most telling argument is based on the pattern of
analysis followed by the supreme court in Larson. sss Ifthe public policy that precludes the separate tort of interference with
custodial rights does not preclude assertion of the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the legislative policy precluding alienation of affection actions should not displace the later developed tort of intentional infliction of
336. See, e.g., Spiess v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1020 (Or. Ct. App.), ajJ'd en bane by an
equally divided court, 765 P.2d 811 (1988). In Spiess, the plaintiff's claim was based on
the actions of his wife's psychiatrist, who engaged in sexual relations with her during
the course of treatment that was intended to preserve the marriage. The plaintiff
alleged that he suffered severe emotional distress as a result. The defendant argued
that the plaintiff's claim was actually a claim for alienation of affections and criminal
conversation. The court of appeals rejected the claim:
[C]riminal conversation consists of sexual intercourse with the spouse of another person, and the elements of alienation of affection are wrongful conduct of the defendant which is intended to cause and which actually does
cause the plaintiff the loss of the affection and consortium of the pwintiff's spouse.
The gravamen of the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, on the other hand, is that the plaintiff has suffered a loss due to intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress. It is the nature of the loss allegedly suffered
by plaintiff in this case that distinguishes his claim of intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress from the torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. He claims to have suffered severe emotional distress as a
result of Johnson's alleged intentional conduct; his claimed loss is not the
loss of his wife's society and companionship. That Johnson allegedly used
his sexual relationship with plaintiff's wife as the means to intentionally inflict
severe emotional distress on plaintiff does not transform plaintiff's claim
into one for either alienation of affections or criminal conversation.
Spiess, 748 P.2d at 1023-24 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69 (Md. 1991), the court took the same
position on similar facts:
The gravamen of Torres' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not merely the sexual act or the alienation of his wife's affections. It
is the entire course of conduct engaged in by his therapist, with whom he
enjoyed a special relationship. This conduct constitutes more than the abolished amatory causes of action. On the record before us, we hold that
Torres' claims for professional negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress should not have been dismissed by the trial court.
/d. at 77.
337. In Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985), for example, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that Virginia's abolition of the alienation of affections action did
not bar a claim by a father against the mother for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on her attempts to tum the child against him. Although tinged with
the alienation of affections action, the court concluded that intentional infliction of
emotional distress is an independent tort. Id. at 339.
338. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 44-47 (Minn. 1990).
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emotional distress. The differences in the elements of the torts
and the high threshold established by the supreme court for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress should serve to
avoid the problems that the legislature intended to avoid in
abrogating alienation of affections actions.
C.

Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

In Potthoff v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 339 the court of appeals took
the position that damages for emotional distress may be compensable for interference with contractual relations. 34o The
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant bus company for
interfering with the plaintiff's employment with a newly
formed bus company.341 Suit was based upon the intentional
interference with contractual relations. 342
The jury found that the defendants had wrongfully interfered with the plaintiff's employment contract and awarded
him damages for lost income and emotional suffering, as well
as punitive damages. 343 The defendants argued on appeal that
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for emotional
suffering. 344
The court of appeals noted that, while damages for emotional suffering are not recoverable in a breach of contract
case, that limitation does not apply in cases involving intentional interference with contractual relations. 345 The trial
court had relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in concluding that damages for emotional harm may be compensable in
an intentional interference action. Section 774A subdivision 1
of the Restatement reads:
One who is liable to another for interference with a contract
or prospective contractual relation is liable for damages for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or
the prospective relation;
339. 363 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
340. [d. at 777.
341. [d. at 773.
342. [d.
343. [d. at 774.
344. Potthoff v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W. 2d 771, 773 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
345. /d. at 777; see also Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.,
277 N.W . 2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979).
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(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a
legal cause; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if
they are reasonably to be expected to result from the
interference. 346
The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing "that emotional distress could be a natural result of interference with contract relations,"347 and that "in appropriate cases emotional distress
damages are recoverable in this type of action. "348
Potthoff illustrates the import of a holding allowing recovery
of damages for emotional distress where one party has intentionally interfered with a contractual relationship. The court
of appeals held that the plaintiff's injury was insufficient to sustain a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 349 After the plaintiff lost his job, due to his first
employer's interference with his contract of employment, the
plaintiff applied for more than fifty jobs and was rejected. He
incurred substantial debts, and his mental state was not "too
good" as a result. 350 His mental state related to the difficulties
he had in not being able to live normally, not having anything
346. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1979). The Potthoff trial court also
relied on an Oregon case, Mooney v.Johnson Cattle Co., 634 P.2d 1333 (Or. 1981),
where the Oregon Supreme Court permitted recovery for emotional distress where
the injury is "a common and predictable result of disrupting the type of relationship
or transaction involved." [d. at 1338.
Comment d to § 774A, discussing damages, reads as follows:
The action for interference with contract is one in tort and damages are not
based on the contract rules, and it is not required that the loss incurred be
one within the contemplation of the parties to the contract itself at the time
it was made. The plaintiff can also recover for consequential harms, pro·
vided they were legally caused by the defendant's interference.
The tests for legal causation for the tort of interference with a contract
of prospective contractual relation, like the tests for determining when an
interference is improper ... , have not been reduced to precise rules. By
analogy to the rules for legal causation for negligent physical injury, it is
sometimes held that the particular loss need not be contemplated, expected
or foreseen by the defendant. ... At other times, it is held that the loss must
be expectable, by analogy to legal causation for the tort of deceit. . . . It
seems likely that the issue in a particular case may be affected by some of the
factors listed in § 767. Emphasis may be given, for example, to the means
used (i.e., physical force or oral persuasion) and to the motive (e.g., intent in
broad sense of knowledge of result, or sole purpose motivated by ill will).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A cmt. d (1979).
347. Potthoff, 363 N.W.2d at 777.
348. Potthoffv.Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
349. [d.
350. [d.
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to do with his time, and not having a sense of self-security.1I51
Nonetheless, the court held that the finding of intentional
interference with contractual relations justified the jury in
awarding the plaintiff damages in the amount of $15,000 for
the emotional distress he sustained, for the same emotional
distress that was not independently actionable under the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 1I52

D.

Misrepresentation and Fraud

Generally, in Minnesota, damages from fraud and misrepresentation are limited to the out-of-pocket loss sustained by the
plaintiff. 1I511 However, there are variations depending on the
type of misrepresentation and the damages sustained.1I54 For
example, damages may be broadened to include recovery for
injury to reputation and lost profits, even if the damages were
not within the contemplation of either the wrongdoer or the
person who relied upon the fraudulent misrepresentations. 1I55
Nevertheless, courts have not conclusively answered whether
damages may be awarded for emotional suffering that is the
product of the fraud or misrepresentation.
In Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler,1I56 suit was brought by
an attorney who was discharged by his firm. The plaintiff sued
for breach of contract, fraud, emotional distress, and defama351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Mesabi Tire Co., 430 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn.
1988).
354. See, e.g., Peterson v. Johnston, 254 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Minn. 1977) (measure
of damages is the amount paid less the fair market value of the property where the
fraudulent misrepresentation is made to a buyer of real estate); Lowrey v. Dingmann,
251 Minn. 124, 127,86 N.W.2d 499, 502 (1957) (where property is purchased in
reliance on fraudulent misrepresentation and the property is not returned, proper
measure of damages is difference between actual value of the property received and
price paid for it, plus other or special damages naturally and proximately caused by
the fraud before its discovery); Nave v. Dovolos, 395 N.W.2d 393, 398 n.l (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (measure of damages in fraudulent misrepresentation involving the sale
of real estate is the amount paid less the fair market value of the property); Melin v.
Johnson, 387 N.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (measure of damages in
case involving misrepresentation by insurance agent is amount of benefits as represented minus the benefits actually received); Whitney v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274,
280-81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (measure of damages in case involving negligent misrepresentation of a third party in a collateral matter related to the sale of property is
not limited to out-of-pocket losses).
355. See Lowrey, 251 Minn. at 127, 86 N.W.2d at 499.
356. 481 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 29, 1992).
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tion. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the plaintiff on all issues but the emotional distress claim. Several
issues were raised on appeal, including the question of
whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for both
breach of contract and fraud in the inducement to the contract. 357 The court of appeals held that the theories were independent and that damages for both were recoverable. The
plaintiff had the burden of proof in ~uch a case to establish
separate damages to avoid a duplicative damages award. 358
The court concluded that the plaintiff had met his burden:
In his complaint, he alleged that the breach of his employment contract caused him to suffer a loss of income. In addition and in contrast, appellant alleged that the fraud
perpetrated by respondents caused him to enter into a situation that ultimately caused emotional distress, damage to
his personal and professional reputation, lost income, and a
move to Arizona.
At trial, [plaintiff] presented evidence relevant to the issue of fraud that was separate and distinct from that which
supported his contract claims. He testified to the long-term
financial difficulty he and his wife experienced as a consequence of his fraudulent inducement to enter the employment contract with DRB. In addition, he testified to the
disgrace of borrowing money to meet expenses; the loss of
clients; the strain on [him], his wife and their two small children; and the anger and depression he experienced. He
testified that in each interview for employment the firm
would ask the reasons for his termination, and that no firm
offered him employment after he divulged this information.
His inability to procure a job with any firm in Minnesota
caused him to seek employment in Arizona where he had
business contacts. The move to Arizona was not by choice,
because [his] family lives in Minnesota. [Plaintiff], who
moved first to Arizona, testified that the five-month separation from his wife and children and their ultimate move
from Minnesota was difficult and upsetting.359

The firm's argument that the plaintiff's damages should be
limited to out-of-pocket loss was rejected by the court of appeals. The direct economic loss he sustained was not covered
by the out-of-pocket rule nor were the other damages he sus357. /d.
358. /d.
359. /d. at 128.
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tained. Notwithstanding the appellant's inability to recover for
emotional distress as a separate and independent tort, the
fraud claim appeared to justify recovery for damages beyond
the out-of-pocket loss.360
In M.H. & j.L.H. v. Caritas Family Services,361 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals considered the question of whether a negligent misrepresentation theory of recovery against an adoption
agency would support damages for emotional distress that resulted from plaintiffs' adoption of a child whose natural parents were siblings. The child was diagnosed as suffering from
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. 362
The court recognized the claim for negligent misrepresentation against an adoption agency, concluding that its holding
did not offend public policy.363 The trial court held that the
agency's conduct was "not sufficiently egregious to support an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim"364 and also
barred the plaintiffs' claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 365 The court of appeals agreed that the facts
were insufficient to support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress but concluded that the trial court
should have allowed a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 366 Relying on Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Commission,367 the court held that a "negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim is properly pleaded where supported by a separately pleaded intentional tort. "368 The court also held that
the plaintiffs did not have to prove any resulting physical injuries where the claim constituted a direct invasion of the plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the court concluded that because "the
intentional misrepresentation claim may go forward, respondents are entitled to add the negligent infliction of emotional
360. Id. at 128-29.
361. 475 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aJJ'd in part, reIJ'd in part, 488 N.W.2d
282 (Minn. 1992). For a discussion of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in
Cantas, see infra notes 369-74 and accompanying text.
362. Id. at 97.
363. Id. at 98.
364. /d. at 99-100.
365. /d. at 99.
366. M.H. &J.L.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 100 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991), aJJ'd in part, reIJ'd in part, 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
367. 428 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
368. Cantas, 475 N.W.2d at 100.
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distress claim."369 The Minnesota Supreme Court370 affirmed
the court of appeals holding permitting the claim for negligent
misrepresentation to go forward, but reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress supported the plaintiffs' claim for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The supreme court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to assert the emotional distress
claims for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs alleged no physical
injury to support the claims, and second, the plaintiffs were
unable to establish a "direct invasion" of their rights by "willful, wanton, or malicious conduct. "371 Once the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for intentional misrepresentation,
there was no basis for concluding that the defendants engaged
in willful, wanton, or malicious conduct.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle,372
the supreme court held that recovery for mental anguish where
the plaintiff has not suffered an accompanying physical injury
will not be allowed "unless there has been some conduct on
the part of defendant constituting a direct invasion of the
plaintiff's rights such as that constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or
malicious misconduct. "373
As the Caritas court noted, there must be a "direct invasion"
and it must be "willful, wanton, or malicious conduct." The
requirements are not disjunctive, but conjunctive. The plaintiffs failed on both counts. Negligent misrepresentation is not
the right kind of "direct invasion," and it does not constitute
"willful, wanton, or malicious conduct."
Notwithstanding the supreme court's disposition of the case,
there are two aspects of the court of appeals' decision that necessitate comment. First, rather than stating that a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress may be asserted once
a direct invasion of the plaintiff's rights is established, the
court of appeals may have been more accurate in holding that
damages for emotional distress might be awarded for intentional misrepresentation without utilizing the negligent mis369. [d.

370. 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
371. [d. at 290 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village ofIsle, 265 Minn.
360,367-68, 122 N.W.2d 36,41 (1963».
372. 265 Minn. 360, 367-68, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963).
373. Id. at 367-68, 122 N.W.2d at 41.
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representation language. A claim for emotional distress is
contingent upon establishing the underlying intentional tort.
Thus, any award of damages for emotional suffering is a product not of proof of negligence, but rather of the intentional
tort claim. Recognizing that the right to recover for emotional
suffering as a product of the intentional tort avoids any tendency to incorporate the more restrictive requirements for the
award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
especially the physical disability requirement. Where the distress is caused by the defendant's intentional conduct, the
plaintiff should be entitled to recover for that distress without
meeting any additional requirements imposed by the law of
negligence.
Second, no clear rationale can be gleaned from the court's
opinion for allowing recovery of damages for emotional distress in misrepresentation actions. The predominant position
in such cases is to limit recovery for damages to pecuniary
loss.374
The same concerns that limit the right to recover in cases
involving breach of contract claims justify limiting the right to
recover in cases where the essence of the claim is misconduct
with respect to a commercial or business transaction. As Professor Dobbs has noted:
In general, it would seem that so long as the plaintiff's recovery is based on an intentional fraud and nothing else,
the tort policy of allowing a broad range of damages, provided they are proved with adequate certainty, should be
followed. To the extent that the plaintiff's claim is based on
something like mutual mistake, or strict liability, special
damages may appropriately be limited or denied altogether.
But even if a broad range of damages is to be permitted
in cases of intentional fraud, it must be remembered that
deceit is an economic, not a dignitary tort, and resembles,
in the interests it seeks to protect, a contract claim more
than a tort claim. For this reason, though strong men may
cry at the loss of money, separate recovery for mental
anguish is usually denied in deceit cases, just as it is denied
in contract cases, simply because emotional distress, though
resulting naturally enough from many frauds, is not one of
the interests the law ordinarily seeks to protect in deceit
374. See Andrew L. Mernn, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1,3-4 (1989).
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cases. 375
Where the plaintiff's claim arises out of a business transaction, the losses should be limited to the business or pecuniary
losses that arise from the transaction. However, a court should
take into account losses such as injury to reputation or credit
rating376 but not recovery for emotional distress, unless that
distress is probable from the nature of the representation
involved.
A variety of approaches to the issue are possible. 377 However, if there is to be a general acceptance of the right to recover damages for emotional distress in fraud litigation, it will
have to be based on recognition of fraud as a dignitary tort,
rather than a tort implicating only pecuniary interests. 378 Absent such a recognition, permitting recovery for emotional distress under circumstances where personal interests are affected
at least offers a middle position that justifies the result in the
Caritas case, yet raises questions about the award of damages
for emotional distress in Brooks. Brooks, on the other hand, offers compelling reasons for rejecting any rigid distinction between business and personal transactions.
E.

Legal Malpractice

In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff is obligated to
prove: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; and
375. DAN B. DOBBS. REMEDIES § 9.2. at 602 (1973).
376. In Autrey v. Trkla. 350 N.W.2d 409. 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). the court of
appeals noted that recovery under the out-of-pocket rule normally will limit the
plaintiff to the recovery of the difference between what the plaintiff parted with and
what the plaintiff received. but the court created an exception in cases where the
plaintiff would be uncompensated for damages caused by the misrepresentation
under the out-of-pocket rule. Uncompensated damages in Whitney v. Buttrick. 376
N.W.2d 274 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). included the tax liability for the sale of property.
The court held that the out-of-pocket measure of damages was irrelevant because the
harm arose not out of the sale. "but rather out of the negligent misrepresentation of
a third party in a collateral. but related. transaction to the sale." !d. at 280.
The court of appeals concluded in Whitney that the plaintiff should have been
instructed that the defendant
could be found liable for damages proximately resulting from his negligent
misrepresentation that he could structure the sale with no tax. The court
should also have instructed the jury that the taxes paid could be an element
of those damages if the jury found from the evidence that the sale could
have been structured in a manner to yield a tax liability of less than [the
actual amount assessed].
Id. at 281.
377. See Merritt. supra note 373. at 7-15.
378. Id. at 38.
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(2) that the plaintiff sustained damages because of the attorney's negligence or breach of contract. 379 The plaintiff is entitled to recover for all damages proximately caused by the
attorney's negligence or breach of contract. For example, in a
case where an attorney fails to file an action within the statute
of limitations, the attorney's liability will be for the damages
that would have been recovered had the action been filed.
Consequential damages may be recovered in cases involving
negligent misrepresentation, with no out-of-pocket loss limitation on damages. 38o The right to recover for other damages,
including damages for emotional distress arising out of legal
malpractice, is less clear.
In Gillespie v. Klun,381 suit for legal malpractice was brought
against an attorney who represented the Gillespies in purchasing an apartment building on a contract for deed. The attorney drew up the purchase agreement and the contract for
deed, representing both the purchasers and sellers in different
capacities. 382 He continued that representation after problems
with the apartment created an adverse situation between the
purchasers and sellers. The purchasers signed documents prepared by the attorney that they believed canceled the contract
for deed. The papers were an agreement, a confession of
judgment, and a quit claim deed that required the purchasers
to execute a confession of judgment in favor of the sellers for
all the debts that were incurred during the purchasers' possession of the apartment building, and to waive their statutory redemption right. 383 As a result, the purchasers experienced
financial and personal problems. The jury awarded damages
for injury to the purchasers' credit and emotional distress.
The court of appeals held that "[e]xtra contractual damages
are not recoverable for breach of contract unless the breach is
accompanied by an independent tort," but since the record
379. See, e.g., Christy v. Salitennan, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-944
(1970). In cases where the defendant-attorney has failed to take some action or raise
some defense, the plaintiff must prove "(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) acts constituting negligence or breach of contract; (3) that such acts
were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages; (4) that but for defendant's conduct the plaintiff would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the
action." Blue Water Corp. v. O'Toole, 336 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. 1983).
380. See Whitney v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
381. 406 N.W.2d 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. July 9, 1987).
382. [d. at 549.
.
383. [d. at 550.
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supported a finding of negligence, the award of damages for
emotional distress was appropriate. 384
There is no clear rationale for the court's decision. While
causation between the defendant's malpractice and the plaintiffs' emotional distress was established, the court did not address the policy problems raised in permitting recovery of
damages for emotional injury in malpractice actions. The majority rule is to permit recovery of damages for emotional distress if the defendant-attorney acted egregiously or the
plaintiff suffered physical injury. 385 Various factors mitigate
against a ready acceptance of the right to recover damages for
emotional distress in malpractice actions, including the fear of
spurious claims and the recognition that, in virtually all cases
where there is an adverse result, the clients will suffer at least
some degree of emotional injury.386
There is a trend toward recognition of the claim for emotional distress, depending on whether the interest of the client
is pecuniary or personal. Where pecuniary damages for emotional distress may be rigidly limited, but the interest is personal and the damage results in loss of liberty, the client may
recover for emotional distress. 387
F.

Invasion of Privacy

The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet recognized the
tort of invasion of privacy. 388 When the courts have discussed
the tort, they have used Prosser's classification scheme, which
breaks the tort into four separate types of invasion of privacy:
(1) unreasonable intrusion upon another's seclusion; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable
publicity to the private life of another; and (4) publicity unreasonably placing another person in a false light in the public
eye. 389
384. Id. at 558.
385. See Joseph J. Kelleher, Note, An Attorney Liability for the Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 58 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1309, 1319 (1990).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1320-21.
388. See Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319, 226 N.W.2d 921,923 (1975);

s

Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical CtT., 448 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn. Cl. App. 1989),
review denied, (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 906
(Minn. Cl. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987); Tibbetts v. Crossroads,

Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Minn. Cl. App. 1987).
389. Stubbs, 448 N.W.2d at 80 (citation omitted).
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The void created by the lack of a recognized action for invasion of privacy is illustrated by the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center. 390 The
plaintiff was a patient of a physician who performed cosmetic
surgery on her. The physician photographed her nose and
chin before and after surgery.391 Later, the hospital began circulating the photographs of the plaintiff. 392 She did not consent to the publication of the photographs. 393
The plaintiff claimed that because of the circulation of the
photographs, she "lost sleep, and had sore throats, cold sores
and headaches."394 While noting the need for a tort to provide
redress in cases where unwanted publicity is given to some private aspect of a person's life, the court, constrained by the
"long established rule in Minnesota" held that "invasion of
privacy is not recognized as a cause of action" and dismissed
the privacy claim. 395
The plaintiff also asserted a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress against the physician and hospitaJ.396
However, the court noted that the plaintiff's allegations did
not meet the severity standard of Hubbard and dismissed the
claim.397
While an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
can parallel a privacy claim, the elements of an emotional distress claim are more difficult to establish, as Stubbs so clearly
indicates. The level of severity required by the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is unnecessary in a privacy
claim. If invasion of privacy is recognized as a separate tort,
then it should be an independent tort supporting the recovery
of damages for emotional distress, even if the plaintiff is unable to meet the elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
390.
391.
392.
393.
1989),
394.
395.
396.
397.

[d.
[d. al79.
[d. al 79-80.

Slubbs v. North Memorial Medical Clr., 448 N.W.2d 78, 80 (Minn Ct. App.
review denied, (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990).
[d.
[d. al81.
[d. al 80.

[d. al81.
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Defamation

Claimants will frequently assert both defamation!l98 and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
in the same complaint. !l99 That practice raises questions concerning the relationship between the claims.
It is clear that recovery for defamation will support the
award of damages for emotional distress. 4oo The primary issue
that arises is whether defamation law imposes a limitation on
the right to recover damages for emotional distress when the
defamation claims fails. The answer depends, in part, on
whether the plaintiff asserted a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress or the intentional infliction of emotional distress and, in part, on the reason for the failure of the
defamation claim.
1.

Defamation and Intentional Infliction oj Emotional Distress

The Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of
Appeals have repeatedly stated that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is allowed only if the plaintiff is
within the zone of danger of a physical impact, fears for her
own safety, and suffers emotional distress as established by
physical injury or manifestations. An exception exists when
the plaintiff suffers a direct invasion of her rights, such as "defamation, malicious prosecution or other willful or malicious
conduct. "40 1
Where the plaintiff asserts claims for defamation ~nd the
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the answer should be
relatively simple. Recovery under the defamation theory supports recovery for consequent emotional harm; failure of the
defamation claim precludes recovery for emotional distress
under the negligence theory. However, the cases are in con398. Defamation requires proof of a defamatory statement that is false, that refers
to the plaintiff, and that is published. See, e.g., Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297
N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980).
399. See, e.g., Strauss v. Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
400. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village ofIsle, 265 Minn. 360, 36768, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963); Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d
670,677 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 2, 1992).
401. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26, 31 (1982) (citing State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village ofisle, 265 Minn. 360,122 N.W.2d 36 (1963»;
see also Strauss v. Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908, 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Bohdan v.
Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, (Minn.
Nov. 13, 1987).
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flict concerning the mechanics and propriety of submitting
claims for defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress, particularly when the defamation claim fails.
In Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co. ,402 the court of appeals
considered the relationship between a defamation claim and
claims for the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The plaintiffs sued the Detroit Lakes Printing Company because it printed an article concerning a murder that occurred outside the trailer home of some of their relatives
which, by implication, defamed the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
sued for "negligent defamation, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel per se."403 In answer to
special verdict questions, the jury found that the newspaper
was negligent in publishing the article, that the paper's negligence was a direct cause of the plaintiffs' injury, and that the
plaintiffs sustained damages of approximately $100,000 for
their embarrassment, mental distress and humiliation. 404
However, the jury also found that the article could not reasonably be understood to refer to the plaintiffs. 405 Based on the
latter finding, the trial court dismissed the negligent defamation claim and refused to award any damages to the plaintiffs.
The trial court had previously granted summary judgment for
the paper on the plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and a directed verdict on their claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 406
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on
the intentional infliction of emotional distress issue, concluding that the plaintiffs' injuries did not reach the level of severity required by the tort. 407
The court of appeals, however, concluded that the trial court
should have allowed the claim for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress to go to the jury.408 While the evidence of
physical manifestation of the emotional distress was minimal,
the court of appeals found the level was sufficient to take the
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
1992).
408.

490 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 141.
[d.
[d.

Id.
Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App.
[d.
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case to the jury. However, the court held that the trial court's
error was harmless, given the jury's findings on the defamation
claims.409
The court's conclusion concerning the claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress is questionable, because the
defamation claim supported the claim for emotional distress
and other mental suffering-not the separate claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. It seems clear that the
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim would be superfluous, both theoretically and in the context of the case. The
separate and independent defamation claim, supporting a
claim for emotional distress, stands on its own. If the plaintiff
establishes the defamation claim, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the emotional suffering engendered by the defamatory statements. If the plaintiff loses on the defamation claim,
for whatever reason, the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot stand independently. Because it is superfluous, the trial court's directed verdict on the issue
appears to be correct.
Covey appears to be in conflict with the court of appeals'
opinion in Strauss v. Thome,410 decided a month later. In
Strauss, the trial court held that dismissal on a motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff's defamation claim also necessitated dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The court of appeals concluded that, because the trial court's dismissal of the defamation claim was
erroneous, the plaintiff was "entitled to have her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress considered on remand as
well. "411 By implication, had the court upheld the dismissal of
the defamation claim, the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress could have not been considered.
If Strauss is correct, then the court in Covey is incorrect in
sending a message to trial courts to instruct juries on negligent
infliction of emotional distress, even if there are physical manifestations of the emotional distress. If the defamation claim
does not succeed, the basis for recovery for emotional harm
also evaporates, unless some other tort claim justifies recovery
for that harm.
409. ld.
410. 490 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. Cl. App. 1992).
411. Id.at912.
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Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress-Limitations

Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are frequently asserted with defamation claims. This practice raises a
question concerning the relationship of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to defamation claims. The limitations to
negligent infliction of emotional distress are inapplicable to a
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Intentional infliction of emotiorial distress, unlike the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, stands alone. The
plaintiff's right to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not depend on his ability to establish the
defamation claim. Thus, the issue becomes whether defamation law, nonetheless, establishes a baseline or limitation that
precludes recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress under some circumstances.
The fact that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover for defamation should not automatically preclude recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rather, the impact of
the dismissal of the defamation claim should be dependent on
the basis for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, the defamation claim might be only a small
part of an overall pattern of harassment. If so, the fact that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover for defamation should not
necessarily preclude recovery for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Conversely, if the conduct that gives rise to
both the defamation and emotional distress claims is the same,
arguably the plaintiff should not be able to circumvent limitations on defamation recovery simply by recasting the claim as
one for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. This is
particularly true where strong policy reasons exist to limit or to
deny the defamation claim.
If the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, then this claim may justify recovery for the emotional
harm sustained by the plaintiff, irrespective of the disposition
of the defamation claim. The courts have not explored this
relationship in detail, but the basic question is whether a plaintiff, barred from recovering for defamation, should also be
barred from recovering under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
There are a variety of reasons why a defamation claim may
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fail or be limited: (1) the plaintiff may be barred by First
Amendment limitations under the federal constitution or its
state equivalent; (2) the fact/opinion limitation may apply, precluding recovery for an opinion; (3) a common law absolute or
qualified privilege may apply, precluding recovery for defamation either because the privilege is absolute or because the
plaintiff is unable to make the showing necessary to overcome
the qualified privilege; (4) the plaintiff also may be unable to
recover anything other than special damages because of a failure to demand a retraction; (5) the plaintiff may fail to prove
one of the essential elements of the defamation claim; or (6) in
a slander case, the plaintiff may lose because he is unable to
establish either slander per se or pecuniary loss.
a.

First Amendment Limitations

In cases where the plaintiff is a public official or figure seeking to recover damages for emotional injury based on defamatory statements, it is clear that the First Amendment
limitations of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan will apply.412 In
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,413 the Supreme Court took the
following position:
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason
of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. This is not merely a
blind application of the New York Times standard, ... it reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment. 414
The same limitation logically extends to any situation where
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 415 applies, even where a private person is involved, so long as the case involves a situation where
the plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of a statement. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,416 the Court held
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

376 u.s. 254 (1964).
485 u.s. 46 (1988).
Id. at 56.
418 u.s. 323 (1974).
475 u.s. 767 (1986).
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that in cases where the publication concerning a private person
is about a matter of public concern, the plaintiff has the burden
of proving the falsity of the statement.
If Gertz applies and a claimant asserts claims for both defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
Court would likely reach the same result as in Falwell. The
plaintiff would have to prove the falsity of the statement, and
an inability to do so would preclude recovery for defamation.
The plaintiff would not be able to avoid the constitutionallimitations in such a case by pleading the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
b.

Fact/opinion Dichotomy

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress may
also be limited by defamation law's fact/opinion dichotomy,
even if not constitutionally compelled. 417 In situations where
the defendant defames the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is a public
figure or official, or the statement concerns a public issue, the
same limitation in Falwell applies to preclude recovery. The
plaintiff's inability to establish a false statement of fact means
that recovery is precluded under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.41S Thus, if the defamatory statement does not imply the
417. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the Supreme Court
held that there is no constitutionally mandated protection of opinion. However, in
Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071
(1991), decided before Milkovich, the Minnesota Supreme Court anticipated the
Supreme Court's holding and held that the fact/opinion distinction rests on state law
grounds:
We reiterate that like protected opinion and "fair comment" on public officials, "[t]he doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy
considerations [and] results from the court's determination that statements
made in particular contexts or on certain occasions should be encouraged
despite the risk that the statements might be defamatory .... " Thus, while
first amendment and other policy considerations underlie this restraint, we
note our decision here is rooted in state defamation law.
455 N.W.2d at 452 (citation omitted).
418. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Huyen v. Driscoll, 479 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991), the plaintiff, a public official, argued to the court of appeals that Milkovich
abolished constitutional protection for opinions. The court of appeals disagreed:
The United States Supreme Court recently determined freedom of expression "is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without
the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact." ... After
stating that the appellate courts' fact/opinion analysis mistakenly relied on
dicta in Gertz, the Court said all statements of opinion are not automatically
protected by the first amendment. ... Citing existing law, the Court clarified that only statements regarding matters of public concern which are not
sufficiently factual to be capable of being proven true or false, and state-
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existence of facts, recovery for defamation will be precluded. 419 If the fact/opinion distinction limits recovery for
defamation it would also appear to be applicable to claims for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress where the emotional distress claim is based on the same statement or
statements. 420

c.

Oy,alified Privileges

Where common law absolute or qualified privileges apply,421
the plaintiff may also be precluded from recovery for both defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. If an
absolute privilege applies, the plaintiff may not recover for defamation, even if the defendant uttered the statement with common law actual malice. If a qualified privilege applies, the
plaintiff may overcome the privilege by showing common law
actual malice or abuse of the privilege. 422 If an absolute privilege applies, or a qualified privilege applies and the plaintiff is
unable to make the showing necessary to overcome the privilege, the policies underlying the privilege seem to be strong
enough to preclude recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the emotional distress claim is based on
the same statements that the defendant was privileged to make
ments which cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts, are
absolutely protected by the first amendment .... Thus, contrary to Huyen's
argument, Milkovich did not abolish constitutional protection for opinions,
but instead merely narrowed the privilege.
Id. at 79.
419. See, e.g., Huyen, 479 N.W.2d at 79-80.
420. However, in cases where there is no constitutional limitation flowing from
Falwell, the court of appeals has noted that at common law there is no fact/opinion
distinction. See Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 673-74
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991).
If the statement implies or states facts, the statement may not be protected
"opinion" and is therefore actionable. See Yetman v. English, 811 P.2d 323 (Ariz.
1991). In Yetman, a county supervisor brought suit against a state legislator who
called the supervisor a "communist." The court held that the jury must determine
whether the statement implied or stated facts about the plaintiff.
421. The existence of the privilege is a question of law for the court. See Lewis v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 890 (Minn. 1986). The plaintiff has
the burden of proving abuse of the privilege. See id.; Stuempges v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980). Common law actual malice differs from New
York Times Co. actual malice. Common law malice necessitates a showing that the
defendant "made the statement from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly
and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff." McKenzie v. William]. Burns
Int'l Detective Agency, 149 Minn. 311, 312,183 N.W. 516, 517 (1921).
422. See supra note 421.
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pursuant to an absolute or qualified privilege. 423 For example,
an absolute privilege protecting participants in a judicial proceeding from defamation claims should also bar recovery for
any ancillary torts based on the same testimony. The policy
favoring open disclosure and free expression would be chilled
if the prohibition against libel claims could be circumvented by
simply recasting the claim in another form.424
In each of the situations discussed in this section, it should
also be clear that the privileges, whether First Amendment or
common law, should not provide protection for statements
that exceed the boundaries of the privilege. Where these statements do exceed the boundaries, defamation and other tort actions, including a claim for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, should be available. 425
423. See, e.g., Kanengiser v. Kanengiser, 590 A.2d 1223 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991). In Kanengiser, an attorney, who received a letter written by another attorney
on behalf of a client, brought suit, alleging four causes of action. The principal claim
was that the letter was libelous and actionable per se. The court concluded that the
letter was absolutely privileged because it was preliminary to a judicial proceeding.
That privilege also barred other claims, including the non-libel causes of action, such
as the allegation for an "extortionate demand:"
This rule is predicated on the common sense observation that the privilege exists to counteract the chilling effect that the potential for civil liability
would otherwise have on the participants in judicial proceedings. This chilling effect would exist regardless of the tag that plaintiff attaches to his cause
of action.
/d. at 1234.
See also Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959), where the Supreme Court stated
that the absolute liability from libel accorded to federal officials will also immunize
them from liability for "kindred torts" arising out of the same statements.
424. In Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 117 A.2d 889 (NJ. 1955),
the New Jersey Supreme Court explained the reasons why a privilege from a libel
action for disclosures in a dispute resolution proceeding also barred ancillary torts:
The libel action privilege grows out of the public policy favoring free
expression in statutorily-required informal dispute resolution proceedings,
without fear of ensuing libel action, short of outright lies or reckless disregard of falsity. An action for tortious interference based on the same verbal
conduct would equally chill the free expression we seek to protect.
/d. at 895. The court also stated that "[i]f the policy, which in defamation actions
affords an absolute privilege or immunity to statements made in judicial and quasijudicial proceedings is really to mean anything then we must not permit its circumvention by affording an almost equally unrestricted action under a different label."
/d.
425. See, e.g., S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989), cert. denied, (Ga. Feb. 15, 1990). The owner and manager ofa restaurant
brought suit against an Atlanta radio station for defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligence, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with
business relations, based on comments made by a radio talk show host during the
course of a restaurant review portion of his talk-show. The defamation claim was
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Retraction Defense

If the defamation claim is limited because the plaintiff failed
to demand a retraction, arguably the plaintiff should not· be
able to circumvent that limitation by making an ancillary tort
claim for the same harm. The policy that underlies the retraction statute-providing the newspaper with an opportunity to
minimize damages by retracting a defamatory statement-is
strong enough to justify preclusion of the ancillary tort.
e.

Failure to Prove an Essential Element

If the plaintiff's defamation claim fails because she is unable
to establish an essential element of the defamation claim, that
same finding may preclude recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, if the defendant did
not intend to refer to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may be unable
to establish the necessary intent to inflict emotional distress on
her. At the very least, a finding that the defendant did not intend to refer to the plaintiff but did intend to inflict emotional
distress on the plaintiff, creates the possibility of a perverse
verdict.
Other limitations, such as lack of publication, should not be
a defense to the claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Publication is not an essential element of the
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and it
seems apparent that the emotional distress claim could be established, notwithstanding the lack of publication of the defamatory statements that caused the plaintiff to suffer
dismissed on summary judgment because the comments made on the talk show slamming the restaurant and the owner-manager either were not shown to have been false
or because the statements were protected speech. However, while some of the comments were protected expression, the court concluded that the protection did not
extend to comments made by the host that encouraged listeners to "[g]o by and see
this guy Weinberg at S & W on Roswell Road [and] [t]ell him he stinks," to "go by
and spit in his face for me," and to "[g]o by there today and give a little five fingers in
the face ... to [him]." Id. at 231.
The court concluded that the words were not protected because they were calculated "to provoke an imminent breach of the peace." The court reached the same
conclusion with respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id.
Judge Pope, in dissent, argued that all the words, including those that the majority perceived to be "fighting words," were constitutionally protected. The exhortations were not such that they could reasonably have been interpreted by listeners as
imminent direction to assault Weinberg, and, although the words were obnoxious,
they were entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at 233 (Pope, J., dissenting).
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emotional distress. There are no strong policy reasons such as
those that support the absolute and qualified privileges that
should preclude recovery for emotional distress where the
harmful statement is not published.
The same should be true if the words are simply not found
to be defamatory. In such a case there would be no more reason to deny the emotional distress claim than in a case where
the plaintiff alleged assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the assault claim failed.
h.

Slander

If the plaintiff is unable to recover in a slander action because the statements are not slander per se or the plaintiff is
unable to establish pecuniary loss flowing from the slanderous
statement, the same analysis should apply. The limitations on
the right to recover for slander are not supported by the policy
considerations that underlie first amendment or common law
absolute or qualified privileges. While those policy considerations may preclude claims for emotional distress where the
privileges apply, the inapplicability of the privileges and limiting policies should mean that the plaintiff should be entitled to
go forward with the emotional distress claim when the slander
claim fails for a reason not associated with the limiting policy.
Wrongful Death

H.

Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 seemingly allows for recovery of only pecuniary loss in wrongful death cases. 426 Fussner v. Andert,427 decided in 1961, is the key Minnesota Supreme
Court case on the definition of pecuniary loss in wrongful
death actions. The case arose out of the death of a family'S
daughter. 428 The court discussed the elements of recoverable
loss for a wrongful death action of a child:
We cannot agree that loss of earnings, contributions, and
services in terms of dollars represents the only real loss the
parent sustains by the death of his child. With the passage
of time the significance of money loss has been diminished.
Conversely, there is a growing appreciation of the true
426.
.... "
427.
428.

"The recovery in the action is ... the pecuniary loss resulting from the death
MINN. STAT. § 573.02(1) (1990).
261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961).
Id. at 348, 113 N.W.2d at 356.
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value to the parent of the rewards which flow from the family relationship and are manifested in acts of material aid,
comfort, and assistance which were once considered to be only of sentimental character. 429
The court provided a historical perspective to the recovery
of wrongful death damages:
An examination of these and other authorities compels the
conclusion that courts and juries in the exercise of their
judgment and experience have not conformed to the limited pecuniary-loss test. It should be no secret to the bar or
the courts that jurors have circumvented the test in order to
provide substantial recoveries which they feel are equitable
under the circumstances. Courts have sanctioned this practice by holding that such verdicts are not excessive. It appears from a review of our authorities that damages are
awarded not only on the basis of contributions and such
services as the evidence may establish but for those additional elements of loss within the broad definition of society
and companionship which include aid, advice, comfort, and protection which the survivor might reasonably expect from the
decedent and which, while not having an easily determined
market value, are fully justified since they are elements of
loss for which money can supply a practical substitute. 43o
The court then indicated how the jury should be instructed
in a wrongful death case:
The jurors should be told that where the evidence warrants
recovery the survivor may be compensated not only for actual pecuniary loss of contributions and services but should
be compensated as well for loss of advice, comfort, assistance, and protection which the jury might find to be of pecuniary value and which the survivor could reasonably have
expected if the decedent had lived. 431

Fussner expanded the recoverable elements of damage in a
wrongful death action for the death of a child. The same extension applies to cases involving the death of adults. In the
1988 decision of Ferguson v. Orr,432 the court of appeals discussed the recoverable losses in a case involving the wrongful
death of an adult. The issue concerned the jury's award of
429.
430.
431.
432.

Id. at 353, 113 N.W.2d at 359 (emphasis added).
Id. at 358-59, 113 N.W.2d at 362 (emphasis added).
Id. at 359, 113 N.W.2d at 363.
427 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 26, 1988).
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zero damages. 433 The court held that the evidence did not
support the zero award, concluding that the decedent "regularly contributed money, advice, comfort and companionship"
to her mother, children and grandchildren. 434
Other Minnesota decisions confirm that some elements of
emotional damages are recoverable for wrongful death. For
example, in Jones v. Fisher,435 the Minnesota Supreme Court
said that damages under the wrongful death act are measured
by " 'pecuniary loss resulting from the death' and include advice, counsel, and loss of companionship."436 In another decision, Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. ,437 the supreme
court held that damages for wrongful death include "companionship, care and advice."438
In Steinbrecher v. McLeod Cooperative Power Ass'n,439 the Minnesota Court of Appeals discussed the recoverable elements in a
wrongful death case involving extraordinary psychological
harm to the decedent's surviving spouse:
All the evidence indicates that Michael was the glue that
held her together. He provided Mary advice, comfort,
assistance and protection. He enabled her to lead a normal
life.
Fussner explicitly distinguished between advice and comfort and mental anguish. Later cases refine the distinction
Existing case law subsumes the idea of "comfort" into the
definition of pecuniary 10ss.440
The lack of clarity in these cases indicates that the distinction
between the elements of damage in wrongful death cases is
blurred. Furthermore, the cases imply recoverable damages
may justifiably include not only the elements specifically
set out in the current model JIG 180441 but also loss of
companionship.
433. /d. at 734.
434. Id. at 735.
435. 309 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 1981).
436. [d. at 730.
437. 420 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1988).
438. Id. at 611 (citing Gray v. Goodson, 378 P.2d 413, 419 (Wash. 1963».
439. 392 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
440. [d. at 714-15 (citations omitted).
441. MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE 180 (3d. ed. 1986) provides for recovery of, inter alia, counsel, guidance, advice and comfort.
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CONCLUSION

The law of emotional distress in Minnesota has not changed
significantly in the last century. Older concepts have been reconsidered in modern explanations, but the approaches have
remained essentially the same. A plaintiff who seeks to recover
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress must meet the
requirements of Purcell, as recycled in Okrina and Stadler. The
plaintiff must be in the zone of danger and suffer emotional
distress as a result of fear for her own safety, and the distress
must be manifested by physical injury. The zone of danger
standard can be abandoned only if the plaintiff either suffers
physical injury as a result of the defendant's negligence, or
proves that the defendant committed a separate tortious act.
There are unanswered questions concerning the right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. Will the
supreme court abandon the zone of danger requirement and if
not, the physical injury requirement? Will the court adopt
some version of the "direct victim" recovery rule that has been
adopted by the California Supreme Court?
The law concerning intentional infliction of emotional distress is also limited. The supreme court, historically cautious
in determining whether recovery should be allowed in cases
involving claims for emotional injury in absence of preceding
physical harm, adopted the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in Hubbard. However, the court, although
concerned about the possibility that independent claims of
mental anguish may be speculative and therefore likely to lead
to fictitious allegations, imposed significant limitations on the
right to recover, limitations that the lower courts have followed
stringently.
There is some confusion concerning the application of the
standards, leaving the courts open to criticism that the guidelines for the recovery of damages for emotional harm have
been administered too rigidly, particularly in the case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a problem that is resolvable by a return to the basics established in Hubbard and Pikop.
Given the limitations on the right to recover for emotional
distress, it is important to determine whether there are alternative avenues of recovery that avoid those limitations. The distinctions between cases where intentional infliction of
emotional cases have been unsuccessful and cases where the
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same sort of emotional injury has been compensable by connecting it to some other underlying tort, highlight the importance of scouring the law to determine whether there are other
theories that will support recovery of damages for emotional
harm. Those alternatives do exist and in fact will provide a
superior basis for obtaining compensation for emotional injury, unless the Minnesota law with respect to intentional infliction of emotional distress is significantly liberalized.
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